Sports: Why the Stat Heads Win

Bill Belichick's controversial 4th down call against the Colts made for a fun time to be a sports fan, particularly for one who is a bit of a stat nerd.  As I wrote following the Indianapolis Colts' comeback win over the New England Patriots, I support Belichick's decision to go for it on fourth and two from his own 28 with a six point lead and about two minutes remaining in the game.

I know!  It's crazy.  While I understand the risks involved, I think it was the right move.  There is some subjectivity involved.  But objectively speaking, there is plenty of data to support this decision.

Of course, I expected to have very little support.  That, as apparent on ESPN.com, ESPN and ESPN Radio, seems to be the case.

Fans are separated into two groups: 1) the stat heads and 2) meat heads who don't care what the stats say.

The stat heads, I admit, are prone to see football in a vacuum.  Use league-wide stats, ignore who is home or away, ignore momentum.

On the flip side, meat heads are impossible to argue with.  You punt there.  It's just what you do.  Conventional wisdom wins.  No other coach goes for it.  Flawed arguments, omitting important factors, and completely ignoring stats.

Mainstream sports media was largely dominated by the meat heads.  But the stat heads were able to gain some steam.

A couple of the more prominent pieces in support of going for it on fourth down were written by Brian Burke for the New York Times Blog and Joe Posnanski for his own blog.  Many of the same arguments in both.

The core argument for Bill Belichick is that the odds of successfully converting fourth down and two was 60%.  The odds that the Colts would score a touchdown from their own 29 was 53%.  And the odds that the Colts would score a touchdown following a punt was 30%.

The meat heads would counter this by saying that the Patriots had a 70% chance of stopping the Colts after a punt compared to a 60% chance of succeeding on fourth down.  You have to punt!

Uh, that's not how it works.  If you understand statistics, the result is that the probability of winning if the Patriots go for it on fourth down was 79% versus 70% if they punt.

I applaud the work, but think it's dangerous to use stats as absolutes.  It isn't black and white.  Those odds apply to all teams in similar situations.  You need to account for these two offensively superior teams and the situation.

The likelihood of the Colts scoring from the Patriots' 29 has to be higher than the norm.  Similarly, the likelihood they score after a punt must also be higher.

Additionally, I feel the 60% number for successfully converting on fourth down may be a little generous.  Even for the Patriots, who have been successful going for it on fourth down with a pass 70% of the time dating back to 2004.

However, keep in mind that most fourth down plays do not decide a game.  In this case, the Colts could focus entirely on stopping the short play.  Not the case in a typical fourth down play that must account for stopping the long pass.

What is the correct probability of each event occurring?  There isn't one.  But we can look at ranges.

So when using stats in this case, I wanted to consider a range for each event.  Probability of success would be determined by ranges in the following scenarios:

• Probability of converting on fourth down between 40 and 65%
• Probability of Colts scoring from the Patriots' 30 between 55 and 80%
• Probability of Colts scoring after a punt between 30 and 55%

I think these are unbiased and reasonable.  In fact, I'd expect them to favor the likelihood of supporting a punt.  Or it will at least be difficult for someone to make the claim that I left out a likely scenario.

Then I applied Brian Burke's formula to every possible scenario at multiples of five (for example, probability of converting on fourth down at 40, 45, 50, 55, 60 and 65%).  Total of 216 scenarios.

I know, I'm nuts.  And a nerd.

This is what I found:

• Of the 216 scenarios, 177 indicate odds of victory when going for it on fourth down were equal to or greater than odds of victory when punting.
• 39 of the 216 scenarios indicate that punting was the better decision.
• In order for punting to be the best option, the most common factor was probability to convert on fourth down.  In 15 of those 39 scenarios, the chance of successfully converting on fourth down was 40% - a number unlikely to be supported by many.
• In 32 of the 39 pro-punt scenarios, the assumption is made that the Colts would have had only a 30 or 35% chance of scoring after a punt.

I provided ranges to cover any reasonable odds.  If you  believe that the Patriots had a 60% chance of succeeding on fourth down, there is no reasonable reason to punt.  If you believe the Colts had greater than a 35% chance of scoring a touchdown with under two minutes from their side of the field (as they had already done twice in the quarter), there are few reasonable explanations to prefer the punt.

Reasonable football fans will grant the Patriots had at least a 50% chance of converting on that fourth down.  Reasonable fans would acknowledge the Colts had a 40% or better chance of scoring on a drive after a punt.

If you grant those things, you acknowledge -- intentionally or not -- that going for it on fourth down was the right move.

So why, then, would someone prefer to go against the odds?

This is the problem I have with people who say you can't use stats and probability when judging this move: Then on what do you base your decision?

Aren't all moves based on probability, even if they aren't based on absolutes?  For example, what should Belichick be thinking as he is making his decision?  Should he do what gives him the highest probability of winning, or should he do what seems obvious?

I'd argue that everyone is basing their strategy on some sort of probability, even if it's faulty logic or missing valuable information.  An example is the argument I've heard repeatedly that you don't give Peyton Manning a short field.  You make him drive 70 yards.

Of course that's the preference!  But that is missing a very important factor.  The Patriots didn't just hand the ball to the Colts at the 29 and say they prefer to give the Colts the ball with a short field.  There was a decision before that to go for it on fourth down.  The exact odds are up for debate, but it's reasonable to say that there was a 50/50 chance that Peyton Manning even gets the ball in the first place.

You can't omit the odds of converting on fourth down from the equation.  That, unfortunately, is what many are doing.  Or they are assuming that the Patriots were never going to convert, which is clearly bad logic.

Not to mention, many are assuming that it's an automatic that the Colts win if they take over at the 29.  Not only do they first have to score a touchdown, but if not for some poor strategy by the Patriots defense, New England may have gotten the ball back one more time to go for a winning field goal.

And to be honest, considering the possibility of getting the ball back also needs to be considered in the odds when deciding whether or not to go for it.  Guess what?  Including that factor would only improve the probability of winning when going for it on fourth down.

In other words, I'm doing everything I can to help the meat heads.  I'm allowing for the possibility that the odds the Patriots convert is below 50% (no matter how irrational that may seem).  I am allowing for the possibility that the Colts had below a 40% chance of scoring a touchdown if the Patriots punted.  And I also omit a scenario which only would have helped the pro-go for it argument.

I'm generous in that way.  But the meat heads are wrong.

And let me be clear, I am not saying that this means going for it is absolutely the right move.  As I've said before, I hate absolutes.  I like the move.  Depending on how you view the different probabilities, it may be the right move.

But many are behaving as if making such a move was stupid.  It wasn't.  It was well thought out.  It was logical.  And it had merit.

Sports: Belichick Roasted for Unpopular Call

Early in the day, I sat on my couch dumbfounded by a coach's ultra-conservative play calling.

The Philadelphia Eagles trailed the San Diego Chargers by a score of 14-0 with a few minutes remaining in the first half.  Philadelphia put their first big drive together.

First and goal from the one.

Second and goal.

Third and goal.

Fourth and goal from the one.

Field goal.

Seemed incredibly illogical to me.  But a largely supported move.

The New England Patriots and Indianapolis Colts faced off for yet another historic clash of the decade's two greatest teams later in the day. The Colts overcame a 17-point deficit to win 35-34 in the waning seconds.

Yet, this game will be remembered for one thing: New England head coach Bill Belichick's decision to go for it on fourth and two from his own 28 with just over two minutes remaining.

With a six point lead.

Running back Kevin Falk bobbled and then secured the fourth down pass near the first down marker, but was called inches short. Replays were inconclusive.

A challenge was not a possibility since the Patriots foolishly squandered their timeouts. A call from the booth was not possible since the play occurred just outside of the two minute warning.

But even had the play been reviewed, it never would have been reversed. Not because it was clearly correctly called on the field, but because there would not have been any irrefutable evidence either way.

In other words, had it been called a first down on the field, it's unlikely such a call would have been reversed either. It was a very subjective call. One of many in football.

Analysts were quick to lambaste Belichick afterwords. He may deserve it. He's not the warmest guy. He's incredibly ballsy.

And this was the ballsiest of ballsy calls.

Thing is, Belichick is the only coach who makes this call. That's a compliment. No other coach has the balls or support from ownership to make it. Any other coach would be fired for such a move.

"The obvious call."

I hate absolutes in football. Immediately we hear...

"You punt the ball in that situation."

"Every time."

"Worst call he has ever made."

Incredibly surprising is the best way I'd describe the call. But mainly because it is never done. Doesn't mean it is completely irrational.

Of course, I thought he was just faking such a move before calling a time out. But when he brought his offense back onto the field to run that play?

Shocked.

Belichick had supreme confidence in his offense.  But he had no confidence in his defense. He was facing Peyton Manning who was moving the ball at will. If the Patriots punt there, Manning has two minutes to drive 60 or 70 yards to win.

Granted, that's a much better alternative to driving 30 yards. But Belichick expected to pick up the first down and end the game there. He wasn't going for it on fourth and 15. It was fourth and two. And I'm still not convinced they didn't pick up the first down.

Look, I can't stand the Patriots. Granted, not a fan of the Colts either. But I enjoy seeing unconventional moves in football. I appreciate a coach who understands there isn't only one way to do things.

Because I'm not a Patriots fan, I feel like I can look at this with an unbiased eye.  Because if I were a Patriots fan, I'd probably be pretty pissed right now.

Belichick's balls may have gotten in the way here. Would have been much safer to punt. But punting guaranteed nothing, too. Getting that extra inch would have guaranteed him a win.

But let's think about this with an open mind, completely unaffected by football's "absolutes." He had two pretty clear options:

1) Go for it on fourth down.
2) Punt the ball.

If he goes for it on fourth down and converts, the game's over. Patriots win. An absolute.

If he goes for it on fourth down and fails, the Colts still need to drive 30 yards for a touchdown. Not an absolute.

If he punts the ball, the Colts still need to drive 60 or 70 yards (or less, who knows?) for a touchdown. Not an absolute.

Either way, if you hand the ball over to the Colts the momentum is on their side.  And the control.

Bill Belichick is a control freak. He didn't want to sit there and watch Peyton Manning pick apart his defense again. He wanted to end the game right there.

But football fans will have plenty of fun ripping Belichick for making the most unconventional, aggressive call, possibly in the history of the game -- or at least the modern game.

In reality, coaches who make the ultra conservative call, the "absolute" call, the "job saving" call that results in a loss are those who should be ripped.

It's funny the polar opposites I witnessed today. On one hand, I saw Andy Reid and the Eagles refuse to go for it on fourth and goal from the one when they were down 14-0 to the San Diego Chargers near the end of the first half.

On the other, I saw Belichick make the most aggressive fourth down call I have ever witnessed.

The majority -- or at least a strong minority -- likely supported Reid's decision. At least those talking in front of a TV camera.

Just put some points on the board. Have to give your team some confidence going into halftime with a field goal.

Worst decision of the day.

He gets that yard, it's 14-7. He fails, his defense still is set up to force a safety or at least get very good field position before the half ends to score again.

But this blog entry is likely to be the only evidence you will read in support of Belichick. Not so much that it was the right call, but I don't fault his aggressiveness.

Belichick was playing to win. Reid was playing to keep his job.