Tipping Pitches

Macha Making Lineups for Dummies

2010-06-08T22:48:00.004-06:00

The batting order ultimately doesn't mean a whole lot, but that doesn't mean a manager needs to be devoid of any strategy.

On one hand, I appreciate Ken Macha for pushing the envelope. He spits in the face of tradition by occasionally batting the pitcher eighth and hitting Ryan Braun second. Yet, the next day he'll put a horrible on base guy like Carlos Gomez second.

It makes no sense.

Many like to criticize Macha for his daily lineup changes, but I understand there needs to be variety. George Kottaras can't start everyday at catcher, and that significantly impacts the lineup (as a high OBP guy, he should hit high while the rookie Jonathan Lucroy should not).

However, Macha seems to have little consistency. It's almost as if he knows a certain strategy is more successful, but he doesn't want to stick with it on a day-to-day basis in fear of excessive criticism.

And when you think about it, it's easy to criticize. Even when he's right, his lineups are often contrarian. And no lineup will work every time. But the dumbed down public can easily criticize when the "right" lineup failed to score in one game. In reality, you need many games to determine success or failure.

Let me cut to the chase. Let me make Macha's life easy. I realize the Brewers have various options and rotations. Here are the lineups he should stick with. I'll provide my reasoning below.

Option #1:

1. Rickie Weeks, 2B
2. George Kottaras, C
3. Ryan Braun, LF
4. Prince Fielder, 1B
5. Casey McGehee, 3B
6. Corey Hart, RF
7. Alcides Escobar, SS
8. Jim Edmonds, CF
9. Starting Pitcher

Why: You're putting your top OBP guys at the top. I'd put Braun and Fielder higher, but with the pitcher hitting ninth here, I want to have guys on base in front of them, and the pitcher would often be a detriment. Kottaras has a batting average just north of .200, but an OBP around .400, so he makes sense near the top. Ultimately, you want runners on base in front of your power hitters. While Edmonds may not be a prototypical eighth hitter, he is patient. Escobar is not. The eighth hitter needs to be selective in front of the pitcher. Additionally, it's nice to have a selective hitter after Escobar so that he can steal a base. You put Escobar in front of the pitcher, and the automatic bunt takes the steal away. Finally, I don't want both Lucroy and Edmonds in the same lineup.

Option #2:

1. Rickie Weeks, 2B
2. Ryan Braun, LF
3. Prince Fielder, 1B
4. Casey McGehee, 3B
5. Corey Hart, RF
6. Carlos Gomez, CF
7. Jonathan Lucroy, C
8. Starting Pitcher
9. Alcides Escobar, SS

Why: Many hate this, but I've grown to appreciate hitting the pitcher eight, particularly when you have a good hitting pitcher (the Brewers have several). This gives Braun and Fielder more opportunities, and Escboar essentially acts as the second leadoff hitter. He doesn't hit in front of the pitcher, giving him opportunity to use his spead. Likewise, Gomez isn't a prototypical sixth hitter, but this isn't a prototypical lineup. I want the top of the lineup to produce with guys on base and extra base hits. The bottom of the lineup with bunts and stolen bases. If Gomez gets on, he gets an opportunity to steal with Lucroy up. And his lack of patience would not be a detriment.

Option #3/4 vs. LHP: swap Braun and Fielder

Why: I've warmed to the swap. Macha drives me crazy because he can make so much sense at times while at others making none. Swapping Fielder and Braun against a left handed pitcher makes complete sense. Braun is having the bigger year. Braun also rakes left handed pitchers. But Fielder is the only real force from the left handed side of the plate, so a pitcher will often pitch around him (even with McGehee hitting behind him). But if you put Braun behind Fielder, pitchers will pay. So they are forced to pitch to Fielder.

I still think there should be variations, and not just these three options. But there is NO REASON a guy like Carlos Gomez should ever hit second in the lineup. He is one of the worst hitters on the team when it comes to getting on base. And if he does get on base, Macha will eliminate the steal in front of Braun and Fielder. So why in the world would you put a guy like Gomez in that spot? Put him where he can be successful.

I can't stress this enough. With a lineup like the Brewers', you need two halves: 1) the top half should be the half that gets on base and gets extra base hits; 2) the bottom half should rely on manufacturing runs with steals and bunts.

Brewer fans often complain about the Brewers' refusal to play small ball, but the complaint is often misplaced. The small ball strategy often doesn't make sense, partly because of the way the Brewers' lineup is designed. You should rarely play small ball in front of Braun and Fielder. Running into outs when an extra base hit is especially possible makes little sense.

But you can do both. You can play for bases and the long ball while also playing small ball later on. You just have to align your lineup appropriately.

The ultimate problem is multi-layered:

1) Fear of short-term failure. Ken Macha won't admit it, but he hates it when he bats the pitcher eighth or Braun second, or some other unconventional format and it doesn't succeed. He needs to ignore the criticism. No lineup is guaranteed success for one game. Fans will light him up, but let them. They aren't bright, and they'll learn. Over the course of the entire season (or at least dozens of games), if you use the right lineup strategy you can maximize runs. That still doesn't guarantee success if your pitching is terrible (or your offense isn't good enough), but it gives you a better chance to win.

2) Mainstream statistical ignorance. I'm sure Joe Morgan would hate such a lineup, as would most announcers on ESPN. They'd scoff, particularly when it would fail (whether reflected in an out or a loss). Let them. The acceptance is growing as is the opposition to shallow thinking.

3) It just doesn't seem right. Look, I've been there. When Ned Yost hit the pitcher eighth, I thought he was a fool. And he probably did it for the wrong reasons. Because he is a fool. But we need to overcome conventional wisdom. Start questioning tradition. Get passed the smell test. Stop saying, "If X manager didn't do it, then...". Tradition is often wrong.

Even as a stat head, I've had some traditional beliefs nailed into my skull when it comes to baseball strategy. I'd always thought there was a place for small ball. And I always assumed a "proper" lineup.

You know what I mean. The fastest guy hits first. The slap hitter hits second. Your best hitter third. Your big power hitter cleanup. Your next biggest power hitter fifth. Your next biggest power hitter sixth. Your non-descript guy seventh. Your other slap hitter eighth. And your pitcher ninth.

We accepted that as how it should be. But when you use logic, it doesn't make much sense. To score runs, you need runners on base. And to score the most runs, you need your best hitters up as much as possible. Finally, the leadoff hitter is only guaranteed to hit leadoff once.

Words to live by.

So help me. Join the revolution. Maybe you aren't a Brewers fan, but do me a favor. Rethink your team's lineup strategy, and challenge conventional wisdom. It's for the good of the game.

Influence of Lineup Spot on RBI -- Guest Blog

2010-05-12T10:58:00.002-06:00

Special thanks to Jeff Parker of RoyallySpeaking.com, who allowed me to invade his blog about the Kansas City Royals with an off-topic dive into XRBI and the impact of lineup spot on production.

[This is a follow-up to my post about the Death and Resurrection of the RBI.]

Today, I'm going to dive deeper into the RBI disparities in lineup spot. There are natural differences in lineup spot that will give one spot more opportunities than another with runners in scoring position. The obvious example is leadoff. If a batter is to come to the plate four times per game, one of four for the leadoff man is guaranteed to be with the bases empty. As a result, such a player is at a built-in disadvantage to drive in runs.

Read More...

The Death and Resurrection of the RBI

2010-05-07T20:35:00.006-06:00

Historically, mainstream sports media has dumbed down baseball statistics. Whether it's displaying a player's stats on the TV screen or providing support for why a hitter should be considered for the Most Valuable Player (or any other offensive) award, we've been spoon fed three main statistics:

Batting Average
Home Runs
Runs Batted In

There are other statistics, but this is what we are supposed to care about most. In fact, we've been told that if you are a truly dominant hitter and lead the league in all three, you should be awarded the Triple Crown. It's the epitome of offensive performance in baseball. Or so we're told.

Lately, the Sabermetrics community has continued to chip away at these long held assumptions. It seems that chicks will forever dig the long ball, but more and more fans are questioning the value of batting average and RBI, in particular.

While batting average may not be completely discarded (instead, seen as a statistic of merit, but inferior to on base percentage), the Run Batted In is viewed by many stat heads as having little or no value at all.

Why the RBI is a Flawed Statistic

It was his work as an RBI machine that netted him a spot in the Hall of Fame... Because he played in the shadow of Johnny Bench, Joe Morgan, and Pete Rose, Perez was underappreciated during his career... -- on Tony Perez, from Cooperstown: Hall of Fame Players

Each night, I read a page or two from this wonderful book to my eight-year-old son, giving him a nice history of the players who are in the Hall of Fame. I couldn't help but cringe when I read this passage.

It's not that I don't think that Tony Perez was a great hitter. He had a long and distinguished career. He may even be deserving of Hall of Fame status. But insinuating that his inclusion as a baseball great falls entirely on this flawed statistic makes a very bad argument.

The problem is that the act of driving in runs is not an individual statistic. It is reliant not only on Perez getting hits (and timely hits), but having teammates who are on base. It is additionally helpful if those teammates are average to above average base runners to maximize runs scored (and therefore maximize runs batted in).

Perez played on some terrific teams. Beyond the Hall of Famers listed above, he also played with Lee May, George Foster, Ken Griffey and Dave Concepcion. Was he overshadowed? Or did Perez benefit as a result?

Part of the reason Perez drove in so many runs was that the Reds were regularly on base. His team scored the most runs in the National League four times from 1968 through 1976 and was second or third three other times during that span.

An example of a potential disparity of riches is represented in the 1975 season, one of the years the Reds scored the most runs in the National League. In nearly 43% of his plate appearances that year, Tony Perez came up with runners in scoring position. He batted fourth or fifth 87% of the time. By comparison, Dick Allen of the Philadelphia Phillies (a distant second in runs scored), batted fourth or fifth 91% of the time. Yet, he came up with runners in scoring position 32% of the time (which was actually the second highest rate of his career).

Perez needed to come through in clutch situations, and he did so frequently. He had a .512 slugging percentage with runners on base that year compared to .403 with the bases empty. But make no mistake, he was granted more opportunities to drive in runs than the typical player. Even had he fared poorly in clutch situations, the vast opportunities assured him of a nice RBI total (he finished with 109 in only 137 games, which was good for third in the NL and short of Greg Luzinski's mark of 120 despite playing in 24 fewer games).

And of course, part of the reason Perez was often up with runners in scoring position was that he hit either clean-up or fifth in the lineup 61% of the time during his career. This may seem obvious, but batters hitting third, fourth or fifth will have the most opportunities to drive in runs.

To again use 1975 as a comparison, the league leader in hits that season was Dave Cash, with 213. He played all 162 games that season as the Phillies lead-off hitter. As a result, he came up with a runner in scoring position only 22% of the time, resulting in a mere 57 RBI.

Of course, part of the reason Perez drove in more runs that year was also that he had more extra base hits than a guy like Cash, who was a singles hitter. Yet, you can't discount the fact that Perez came up in prime position to drive in runs nearly double the time.

Moreover, we are led to believe that singles hitters don't drive in runs because they are rarely in position to post high RBI totals. The reality is that a guy like Cash who piles on singles throughout the season would put up comparable RBI totals to a clean-up hitter with many more home runs and a much lower batting average -- only if, of course, both hitters were to come up to the plate with identical opportunities.

No two players have the same opportunities to drive in runs, and in fact the disparity when comparing different teams and lineup positions is significant. As a result, the RBI statistic is greatly flawed.

The Solution

Now, I'm not the first to propose some sort of solution to this (note: of course, I hoped I was but a Google search brought me back to reality). Tom Ruane of Retrosheet wrote a piece about Joe Carter a while back. Carter was a guy who would regularly hit for a low average but drive in a large number of runs.

Tom Tango, who developed the wOBA statistic, provided some inspiration for this study. Tango's stat is seen by many as being one of the most important measures of offensive worth. Among other things, wOBA assigns a runs created value to each offensive result. Runs created, however, combined both runs scored and runs driven in as a result of that outcome.

Luckily, Tom's a very accessible guy, and he provided a general RBI value for a single, double, triple, home run, strikeout (which is always zero), other out (including sacrifices), walks and hit by pitch, both with and without the DH. How? Lots of work, I'm sure. Taking all identical situations and averaging how many runs are batted in over several years of data.

First, the values (which have been shortened to be more manageable):

Single = .22
Double = .43
Triple = .64
Home Run = 1.6 (including driving one's self in)
Strikeout = 0
Other Out = .0275
Walk/HBP = .02

What does this mean? It means, given the average situation -- runners on base, base running ability of those on base, etc. -- a single will result in .218 runs driven in. It should be remembered that a batter does not need to get a hit to drive in a run, which is why outs, walks and hit by pitch are also included.

Suddenly, we can take the offensive output of any two players and determine which would have been the better run producer given identical circumstances. It's a wonderful stat, though of course it still is not perfect. Such a stat would not consider if a player were more "clutch" in situations where runners are in scoring position.

Yet, the variation (which I call XRBI) is still a vast improvement over the current RBI statistic. Below is a collection of the top 100 players in career XRBI, also including their total RBI and respective ranks. While there aren't a lot of major differences at the top (Hank Aaron is first either way), you'll note that several players you do not normally consider run producers (singles hitters like Pete Rose and Lou Brock) move way up in run production given a level playing field of run producing opportunities. Think that's weird? Look outside the box.

Oh, and Tony Perez, though he did indeed benefit from playing on offensive minded teams, was still a great run producer in terms of XRBI -- still 41st overall.

Player Name	RBI	RBI Rk	XRBI	XRBI Rk	DIFF
Hank Aaron	2297	1	2275	1	0
Barry Bonds	1996	4	2059	2	2
Willie Mays	1903	10	2002	3	7
Babe Ruth	2217	2	1941	4	-2
Stan Musial	1951	6	1899	5	1
Rafael Palmeiro	1835	14	1789	6	8
Frank Robinson	1812	18	1785	7	11
Ken Griffey	1829	16	1776	8	8
Carl Yastrzemski	1844	12	1775	9	3
Eddie Murray	1917	9	1755	10	-1
Dave Winfield	1833	15	1675	11	4
Mel Ott	1860	11	1665	12	-1
Cal Ripken	1695	24	1662	13	11
Pete Rose	1314	91	1646	14	77
Reggie Jackson	1702	23	1624	15	8
Lou Gehrig	1995	5	1617	16	-11
Jimmie Foxx	1922	8	1614	17	-9
Ted Williams	1839	13	1604	18	-5
Alex Rodriguez	1706	21	1604	19	2
Sammy Sosa	1667	26	1604	20	6
Gary Sheffield	1676	25	1586	21	4
Ty Cobb	1937	7	1583	22	-15
Ernie Banks	1636	28	1573	23	5
Manny Ramirez	1788	19	1555	24	-5
Al Kaline	1583	37	1546	25	12
Andre Dawson	1591	34	1535	26	8
Frank Thomas	1704	22	1529	27	-5
George Brett	1595	32	1528	28	4
Mickey Mantle	1509	50	1519	29	21
Mike Schmidt	1595	32	1510	30	2
Billy Williams	1475	52	1490	31	21
Eddie Mathews	1453	55	1483	32	23
Fred McGriff	1550	41	1480	33	8
Harmon Killebrew	1584	35	1475	34	1
Jim Thome	1565	39	1470	35	4
Harold Baines	1628	29	1462	36	-7
Willie McCovey	1555	40	1451	37	3
Craig Biggio	1175	150	1439	38	112
Rickey Henderson	1115	183	1436	39	144
Paul Molitor	1307	97	1428	40	57
Tony Perez	1652	27	1428	41	-14
Robin Yount	1406	68	1419	42	26
Tris Speaker	1529	45	1410	43	2
Al Simmons	1827	17	1399	44	-27
Rogers Hornsby	1584	35	1398	45	-10
Luis Gonzalez	1439	59	1388	46	13
Jeff Bagwell	1529	45	1386	47	-2
Willie Stargell	1540	42	1384	48	-6
Chipper Jones	1445	57	1377	49	8
Dwight Evans	1384	71	1367	50	21
Dave Parker	1493	51	1364	51	0
Jeff Kent	1518	48	1345	52	-4
Honus Wagner	1732	20	1343	53	-33
Brooks Robinson	1357	77	1338	54	23
Carlos Delgado	1512	49	1335	55	-6
Mark McGwire	1414	66	1329	56	10
Darrell Evans	1354	78	1328	57	21
Rusty Staub	1466	53	1325	58	-5
Jim Rice	1451	56	1315	59	-3
Roberto Clemente	1305	98	1313	60	38
Carlton Fisk	1330	85	1306	61	24
Ivan Rodriguez	1264	114	1304	62	52
Steve Finley	1167	156	1302	63	93
Goose Goslin	1609	30	1293	64	-34
Andres Galarraga	1425	63	1291	65	-2
Joe Carter	1445	57	1289	66	-9
Vada Pinson	1170	155	1288	67	88
Vladimir Guerrero	1318	90	1287	68	22
Graig Nettles	1314	91	1287	69	22
Orlando Cepeda	1365	76	1276	70	6
Cap Anson	2076	3	1269	71	-68
Gary Gaetti	1341	80	1266	72	8
Duke Snider	1333	83	1265	73	10
Chili Davis	1372	74	1262	74	0
Joe Morgan	1133	172	1258	75	97
Joe DiMaggio	1537	44	1256	76	-32
Mike Piazza	1335	82	1251	77	5
Larry Walker	1311	93	1248	78	15
Paul Waner	1309	95	1247	79	16
Charlie Gehringer	1427	62	1244	80	-18
Jose Canseco	1407	67	1239	81	-14
Dale Murphy	1266	113	1238	82	31
Nap Lajoie	1599	31	1225	83	-52
Ron Santo	1331	84	1224	84	0
Juan Gonzalez	1404	69	1221	85	-16
Johnny Bench	1376	73	1218	86	-13
Al Oliver	1326	87	1217	87	0
Steve Garvey	1308	96	1215	88	8
Sam Crawford	1525	47	1212	89	-42
Garret Anderson	1353	79	1210	90	-11
Yogi Berra	1430	61	1209	91	-30
Lou Brock	900	338	1204	92	246
Tony Gwynn	1138	169	1204	93	76
Roberto Alomar	1134	171	1200	94	77
Don Baylor	1276	107	1187	95	12
Eddie Collins	1300	101	1185	96	5
Ellis Burks	1206	129	1184	97	32
Jason Giambi	1330	85	1182	98	-13

Blogging Ethics and an Impending PED Suspension

2010-04-20T11:56:00.003-06:00

Monday night, @injuryexpert (Will Carroll of Baseball Prospectus) tweeted the following:

Ped suspension is coming.

This morning, he clarified in Under the Knife:

I hate covering these but for over a month, I've been getting whispers that there was a PED suspension being appealed. The process can be an extensive one, involving hearings and testimony, as well as some negotiation. There's no room to "plead down" on a positive test, so the attack is usually on Christiane Ayotte and her Montreal lab. Yesterday, I learned that a high-ranking baseball executive spoke off the record about the suspension being announced. He said it was a pitcher, but I couldn't get any solid confirmation of that fact by the time I posted on Twitter. (And yes, I did feel some pressure to get this out, but I also realized that by doing so, I was pretty much guaranteeing that someone else would break the name first.) I feel very confident in my information on this, but still have no idea about the name or the substance (though it's not an amphetamine.) It's pretty amazing that in a world where the new iPhone is pictured on the net, that baseball could sneak through the entire multi-week process with no leaks. That speaks well of the process put in place by the OIC and the MLBPA. While I expect the announcement today, baseball moves at its own pace

Later, Craig Calcaterra of NBCSports Hardballtalk clarified:

UPDATE II: I have learned that the player to be suspended is a National League pitcher.

UPDATE: I have learned that the PED suspension is NOT a New York player.

If you know me at all, you know that I eat this stuff up. It's not that I relish the downfall of athletes. I simply want every PED user brought down. If they did the crime, bust them. The more players who slip through the cracks, the less likely the game will ever be cleaned up. So even when the facts aren't all yet clear, I appreciate getting the heads up that something is coming. Builds the drama, and to be honest it's good journalism if what you want is to drive traffic to your site.

Of course, not all agree with this sentiment. Both Calcaterra and Carroll were widely panned for releasing "rumors" before all the facts were known in an effort to be "first." The argument: Until you know the player and the transgression, keep your trap shut.

Eh, I disagree. I believe both writers were responsible in the way this was handled. Neither began speculating on the name of the player being suspended. Both simply released the information known to be true. If there is indeed a player suspended this week, then we know they were reporting the facts. And if you have a reliable inside source, it's not a "rumor" in the first place.

Whether all of the facts are available yet or not, this is big news. The only big names to get a MLB imposed PED suspension are Rafael Palmeiro and Manny Ramirez. All reports are that the player will be a "semi big name" so this isn't small news.

If a plane goes down but you don't know who was on board, you report it. If a local 7-11 is robbed and you don't know the name of the perpetrator, you report it. You're responsible for making sure the information you release is accurate, but you report it. You release the additional facts as they come in, but you report what you know.

In particular, this is the type of reporting we should expect in our new, real-time media. Facts will trickle in. Information will be leaked. And as that information is available, we want to know. Those who claim we don't do not speak for the larger population.

Now, don't get me wrong, this can lead to irresponsible reporting. Once the word leaked of an impending suspension, fake news spread like wildfire about which player was involved. It wasn't the speculation that was the problem, but the false incrimination of players on blogs as if it was confirmed fact.

I won't mention the most popular name spread here because I will attempt to be responsible. I don't want to perpetuate a rumor proved to be false to my two readers (player's name starts with a "D" and ends with a "t").

But it does also raise a question: When, if ever, is speculation acceptable? And on which media? By whom? Falsely (and intentionally) naming a player as a PED user as an official, factual report is clearly wrong. What about talking with a friend? Talking on the phone? Writing an e-mail? This type of speculation is human nature. It's ultimately freedom of speech as well.

But what about speculating with social media? I naturally have my own suspicions. Everyone does. I'd suggest that speculation on Facebook isn't typically a problem since it is essentially a conversation with your friends (if you so choose to limit your audience to your friends only). On Twitter... there may be a gray area.

I admit that I speculated on Twitter (with my TippingPitches and not personal account), though I did so with a question mark to make it clear that this was not a report. Is this crossing the line? I have a public feed, but I also only have 58 followers. Granted, word can spread quickly, but one could argue that responsibility increases with the size of the audience. Or, one could also argue, you should be careful no matter what your audience.

So maybe that was a lame move on my part. But what if you don't have a blog? What if you're just talking sports because you're a fan? Do these people have a responsibility not to publicly speculate?

What do you think?

Trying to be a Reasonably Emotional Brewers Fan

2010-04-16T22:21:00.001-06:00

I am a Brewers fan. By definition, I have endured years of torment. Things were pretty good in the early years of my fandom, followed by more years of bottom dwelling than any one fan should ever endure.

I'm generally a pretty passionate dude. I wear my emotions on my sleeve. I root hard for my teams, and I take it way too personally when things don't go well.

But I'm also getting older, more reflective, and more realistic. Now that the Brewers come into each season with some sense of optimism, I still don't demand a World Series or even the playoffs. I hope for it, but I realize much needs to go their way.

But the passionate side of me wants to break something about now. After 10 games, the Brewers have won four games and lost six. It's not even that they've lost six games that bothers me. This is nothing. It's how they lost them.

Two of the losses came to the Cardinals when the game was in the Brewers' back pocket. A lead in the ninth, Trevor Hoffman just has to shut the door. Once a one run lead with two outs, the other a three run lead. Both times, losses. Painfully.

Two more losses came when the Brewers had leads in the eighth. The previously reliable LaTroy Hawkins, each time, melted down to allow multiple runs and cough up the game. Each time, he was singled to death. One time against the hated Cubs.

Before today's heart-breaking loss, I had a talk with my eight year-old son that there's nothing to worry about. Anything can happen. They could start out 10-0 or 0-10, but that doesn't mean anything.

It's true, but I don't know how a fan can continue to endure losses on this painful scale so close together. You can be reasonable for just so long before worry sets in.

My biggest concern with this team isn't even the bullpen. It's not the offense, the one positive in an otherwise rough start.

It would be easy to say it's the bullpen, but that's too easy and obvious. Yes, they've coughed up leads repeatedly, but you can make a very reasonable argument that the bullpen will eventually be a strength of this team. No, there is something else here.

The offense won't always be perfect. The pitching won't always be great. But there are two constants with good teams: Solid defense and fundamentals. This team lacks both. As a result, it puts them in a position like they were in tonight where the game was close enough to blow a lead in the first place.

There should have been a large lead in the eighth. The Brewers reached base 12 times. In seven at bats with runners in scoring position, they managed a hit only once.

Carlos Gomez failed to put down a bunt four times. He also was doubled up -- stupidly -- off of second to end a rally in the eighth.

So they couldn't get the big hit and they couldn't execute fundamentally. But even then, this game could have been won. With a one run lead, Hawkins gave up an infield single on a weakly hit ball to third before hitting Josh Willingham. After a successfully executed bunt, Adam Kennedy drove in two runs on a single under the glove of Prince Fielder.

The thing is, it's called a "single" in the box score, but good first basemen make that play. He makes it, and there are two outs and still a one run lead. Granted, Will Nieves fallowed with a weak single of his own, but it's a different situation that could have ended with a different result.

And maybe the Brewers still lose that game, but it underscores the problem: This team can hit, but the lack of fundamentals and defense give the pitching little room for error. They may be fine if the pitching is average, but anywhere below average (or way below average, as they've been so far), and this team is in trouble.

I want to be clear that when I say "fundamentals" I am not suggesting the Brewers need to bunt or steal more often (many interpret such a word this way). I'm simply suggesting smart, sound baseball. It doesn't mean getting cute with unnecessary strategy. It just means not making repeated mistakes.

The offense will be up and down throughout the season, as will the pitching. But defense and fundamentals will carry you through rough times when hitting or pitching are not so strong.

I fear that these are two qualities that this team cannot improve. Which means they will rely on three things: 1) An exceptional offense, 2) an average pitching staff, and 3) luck.

Now, I'm a bit emotional after this loss, and I generally brush off a bad game or bad stretch of games while others claim the sky is falling. But I don't like that formula. The sky may not be falling, but it sure ain't sturdy.

Fixing Baseball: The Salary Cap Alternatives

2010-04-05T22:26:00.001-06:00

I've spent an awful lot of time and energy dissecting Major League Baseball's financial disparities and pushing for a salary cap. A conversation with my son today made me wonder: Have my priorities been poorly ordered all along?

As you may know, my son's third grade projects are my source of many a baseball research inspiration. It's because of a project I designed for him that I am in the process of ranking baseball's greatest players. Today, he told me of a presentation that he will be giving on baseball (of course). He will be answering 15 "questions" about the game.

11. How many rules have been added, taken away, and changed over the past 15 years?

Trying to lead him to one of these rules, I asked him why it is that teams like the Brewers are no longer able to keep their star players.

"Because of money?" he asked.

"Well, not really. Something comes before the money." Of course, I was speaking of free agency.

The Yankees are the target. The easy target. They spend the most money. They would seem to be the problem. With a salary cap, they could not spend so much money.

Well, sure, this is true. Partially. But it's only because of free agency that they're able to spend that money on any player they want. If a player wasn't a free agent in the first place, they'd have to focus their spending power on their own players.

Now, I'm not suggesting that baseball scrap free agency. But I think it's important to recognize that the initial problem isn't the Yankees or that there isn't a salary cap. The true problem is free agency -- free agency in its current form.

There are two surface issues with free agency (in addition to many more below the surface):

1) Small market teams rarely keep the star players they develop;
2) Flawed compensation structure for losing star players.

In many ways, these two are interrelated. Small market teams know they have little chance of signing a player if he goes to free agency. And if they lose said player to free agency, they will get a draft pick or two in return. The MLB Draft is an inexact science, so it's not much of a reward. So, rather than lose a player to free agency, teams choose instead to trade him while the return is still formidable. Waiting too long to trade a player will limit the return.

In other words, small market teams that develop a superstar are pressured to trade a player prior to his final year under their control, while he still has the most value. As a result, the "six years of control" would be a bit of a mirage. Sure, teams have the rights to a player for six years. But as you want to sell a stock before the value drops, teams often prefer to trade early rather than give their player away for the unknown quantity of a couple of picks.

So while teams have six years of control, it's often five. And while teams often have five years of control, those players are often at peak "star" level for only three of them.

Here are a few salary cap-free ideas that could help make free agency a better system:

1) Guarantee draft pick compensation.As the current system works, a team signing a Class A free agent will give up a first round pick (or their top available non-compensatory pick). If this team signs multiple Class A free agents, the signing of the lower rated free agent results in a loss of a second round pick. Great for the signing team, bad for the team losing the player. The solution would be to only allow the signing team access to the player if they have the corresponding pick to lose.

To make this work, I'd suggest loosening the rules on which picks are free game. Currently, compensation is limited to losing the picks they were scheduled to own before free agent compensation. However, I suggest that if a team loses a Class A free agent (thus giving them two first round picks), they would be allowed to sign two similar free agents (assuming they also have the second round picks to lose). In the case of signing two Class A free agents, highest pick would go for signing the higher rated player.

2) Improve draft pick compensation. The top available hitter and pitcher should each require the signing team's first and second round picks in addition to a sandwich pick between the first and second rounds.

Each of the first two adjustments would do two things: 1) With the compensation guaranteed, teams will not be stuck with a second round pick when they should have received a first round pick (see when the Brewers lost CC Sabathia to the Yankees, who also signed Mark Texeira the same off-season); 2) With compensation improved, the signing team has to think twice about giving up two high picks; and 3) With compensation improved, the player's former team has more motivation to hold onto their player through the entire six years.

3a) Increase team control to seven years before a player becomes a free agent. I'd love to say eight years, but I realize that seven would be a battle in itself. In addition to the increased draft pick compensation, home grown players would go from five years with the original team to seven, a noticeable improvement.

Note that such a change could also alter the amount of money he will command on the open market (though a more detailed study would need to be performed to confirm this). Assuming an average rookie age of 23, players would then go on the market at 30 -- instead of on the market at 29 or acquired via trade at 28. This may seem like a minor adjustment, but you may see shorter contracts and less money being thrown around to free agents as a result, thus getting free agent spending under control.

Now, getting that extra year may be a challenge. So, there could be a viable alternative...

2b) Team with a home grown player given the option after the sixth season to either "Franchise" that player or allow him to become a free agent. Let me explain. Using the rating system that classifies free agents, a team could put a Franchise tag on a Class A free agent, assuming it is a home grown player following their sixth year. In such a case, the player would be guaranteed a one year salary that is the average of the top 10 among hitters or pitchers (depending on the player). Additionally, Class B free agents could be given the average of the next 40, Class C the following 50. Of course, this amount could be tweaked.

The team could decide that such a player was not worth that kind of money and grant him free agency. If they do tag the player, they get him for at least one more year. Of course, if a player changes teams prior to their six year window expires, this does not apply. All players who are not home grown would not be subjected to such a tag.

Again, if a Class A player then becomes a free agent, he may be less likely to sign for huge money with another team because of the increased compensation and likelihood that he would be a year or two older than he would otherwise be on the open market. This could also help teams keep their home grown players, even when they become free agents.

Obvious Roadblocks
Of course, getting any of these proposals -- or even a variation thereof -- would be a chore. But in my opinion, they are more likely than the implementation of a salary cap to happen.

I've all but given up on a salary cap. The league is too far gone. When a team like the Yankees has a payroll that is four times that of some other teams, you can't penalize them going forward for something that occurred in the past. You can't set would would seem to be a reasonable salary cap of $100 Million when one team nearly doubles that now.

But while a salary cap is as likely as snow in Mexico, I realize that my proposals would get their share of objections as well. My goal is clear: 1) Keep players on their original teams longer (if those teams choose), and 2) Deter big spenders from signing all of the best players. Additionally, if the average age of free agents increases, the length and amount of the average contract would likely drop (less committed to players who are expected to decline sooner). As a result, the Players Association would have a difficult time with it.

Still, there may be a carrot somewhere that could make it happen. But discontent is growing. The financial gap between the Yankees and everyone else is widening. While a salary cap may not be possible, there are other ways to control what has become a very flawed and unfair system.

MLB 2010 Non-Predictions: 10 Things That Will Happen

2010-04-03T20:36:00.005-06:00

These aren't predictions. These are the things that we know will happen this year. Why? Because they happen every year.

10. The Yankees will make the playoffs.

9. The Red Sox will make the playoffs.

8. As a result of the Yankees and Red Sox making the playoffs, small market fans will scream for a salary cap. Red Sox and Yankees fans will laugh at them.

7. There will be no salary cap.

6. The Cubs won't win the World Series.

5. Fewer than three Major League players will get busted for steroids. As a result, Bud Selig will proudly proclaim that "testing is working."

4. Jeff Suppan will suck.

3. Some obscure player will start out on fire for the first month of the season. Mainstream media will fall over themselves, calling him "the real deal." Soon after, said player sucks again and mainstream media forgets.

2. Tim McCarver will say dumb stuff and Joe Morgan will attempt to one up him by belittling Sabermetrics. Both will keep their jobs. The world will groan.

1. Hundreds will make safe predictions before the season starts. Hundreds will make unconventional predictions before the season starts. No one will be right, but no one will care.

What did I leave out?

The Rebirth of Suckball

2010-04-02T16:32:00.006-06:00

Several years ago -- eight maybe -- I "invented" a little something called Suckball. I use the quotes here because I realize there are no true inventions anymore. It was somewhat original, but something that I'm sure was done before. In fact, it's been done several times since then (I'll secretly take undeserved credit).

Of course, I did this while writing for Rotoworld, and our friends there loved that article so much that it no longer exists. Thanks, fellas. So there's no proof. You'll just have to believe me. Or humor me -- nod your head and smile, act like you read it.

The premise is simple: Pick the suckiest team possible. I know what you're thinking. "Just pick a bunch of tool boxes who never play!" You aren't the brightest, my friend. Of course we wouldn't do something like that. You want players who suck, but the "best" player to own would be one who sucks most often.

Think the Milwaukee Brewers' starting rotation in 2009, minus Yovani Gallardo. Suckball Kings. For offense, think Bill Hall.

In fact, I used Bill Hall as the gauge for determining when the scoring system was just right. If he was ranked anywhere outside of the top five, the scoring needed tweaking. What I finally came up with makes Bill Hall's 2009 season (334 AB, 8 HR, 120 SO, 11 GIDP, .201 AVG, .258 OBP) the second best offensive Suckball performance of the year.

The scoring system? Well, here it is for the hitters:

AB = 2
R = -2
H = -2
HR = -20
RBI = -2
SH = 2
SF = -2
SB = -6
CS = 2
BB = -2
SO = 2
GIDP = 2
Error = 2

Play Suckball!

Go here
League ID#: 626264
Password: suckball

Here are the 10 suckiest hitters last season:

1. Emilio Bonifacio
2. Bill Hall
3. Jason Kendall
4. Koyie Hill
5. Willy Taveras
6. Rob Johnson
7. Gerald Laird
8. Yuniesky Betancourt
9. Adam Everett
10. Joe Thurston

Let me be clear that the process for finding this scoring system was far from scientific. It ain't no Sabermetrics. I essentially used a lot of trial and error and the famous "smell test."

Now, I'm still tweaking the pitching points, but this is what I have so far:

Wins = -20
Losses = 10
Saves = -10
Outs = -1
Hits = 3
Earned Runs = 1
Home Runs = 10
Walks = 2
Hit Batters = 5
Strikeouts = -5
Wild Pitches = 5
Balks = 5
Holds = -10
Blown Saves = 20

As a result, here are the 10 suckiest pitchers from a year ago:

1. Jeff Suppan
2. Josh Greer
3. Jason Berken
4. Daniel Cabrera
5. Tomo Ohka
6. David Hernandez
7. Fausto Carmona
8. Logan Kensing
9. Sidney Ponson
10. Carlos Carrasco

I can get behind any Suckball rating that puts Jeff Suppan at the top.

I reserve the right to adjust these points a bit. In particular, the highest point scorer got about 300 a year ago, so I may just want to bump everything up a bit. Chicks love points.

So who wants in? Go here. If it asks for any info, here it is:

League ID#: 626264
Password: suckball

MLB 2010: The Greatest Predictions Ever (from kids)

2010-04-01T20:52:00.004-06:00

If you know me, you know that I hate predictions. Sure, I wrote a 2010 Brewers preview and begrudgingly gave a haphazard wins prediction (85), but it was more or less the way I see them entering the season. Anything can happen. As they say, it's why they play the game.

I'm no fool, I know what's up. "Experts" stand up there and speak with conviction. They are supposed to be confident in their words or we won't think they are experts. But the truth is that despite the mounds of knowledge they have, they really have no idea how it will play out.

It's also why it kills me when fans freak out this time of the year, claiming their team's general manager is an idiot for doing this or not doing that. Please. Let's just wait and see how it plays out.

Luckily for everyone, I have the crystal ball. The magic wand. The Delorean, if you will. Vegas should hate me.

The source? My kids.

That's right. I'm going to give you predictions that are as good as any others that are out there. And they come from Michael, eight, and P-Dubs, who is five.

Note that I didn't provide any influence over these predictions. I wanted my boys to do this completely on their own, unaffected by the idiot adults. Think the Brewers are going to win the World Series? Fine!

Of course, they outsmarted me a bit. Michael gave P-Dubs a little talk before they collaborated on their predictions: "Now remember, this is about what is actually going to happen, not what we hope is going to happen." Wise words. Honestly, I think some experts need to live by them.

All I gave them was the 2009 results. From there, they were on their own. I stood back. Made no comments. Made no faces. This is purely from them. A third grader and a kindergärtner.

[Note: I was hoping to compare their predictions to those of a major media outlet. Strangely, it seems sites like ESPN have become wise to this. They don't want the criticism. While individual experts will predict division and Wild Card winners, I couldn't find a league or World Series anywhere on ESPN or SportingNews. Luckily, my boys have the guts to make such a prediction.]

AMERICAN LEAGUE
EAST	CENTRAL	WEST
NY Yankees	Minnesota	Seattle
Boston	Chicago Sox	LA Angels
Tampa Bay	Detroit	Texas
Baltimore	Cleveland	Oakland
Toronto	Kansas City

Wild Card:	Boston
AL Champ:	NY Yankees

NATIONAL LEAGUE
EAST	CENTRAL	WEST
Philadelphia	St. Louis	LA Dodgers
NY Mets	Milwaukee	San Francisco
Atlanta	Chicago Cubs	Colorado
Florida	Houston	San Diego
Washington	Cincinnati	Arizona
	Pittsburgh

Wild Card:	San Francisco
NL Champ:	LA Dodgers
World Series Champ:	NY Yankees

Five Steps to the Perfect Family Fantasy Baseball League

2010-03-29T21:41:00.001-06:00

I'm a dad. I'm a stat nerd. I'm the father of three boys, two of which are at various levels of baseball stat nerd-dom (the third is a baby nerd). I want to encourage this nerd-ocity, and there are few better vehicles than fantasy sports.

Fantasy baseball is also a good way to get the competitive juices flowing with the family. Nothing serious, but good, clean fun. Of course, the ultimate challenge is making the league fair. As you know, I'm a baseball genius (go ahead, roll your eyes). My eight-year-old Michael is the heir to my Nerdery. After that, my wife Lisa and five-year-old Ryan (aka Pee Wee, P-Dubs or PW) are still figuring it out.

But I'm happy to say that we are running our second fantasy baseball league and the fourth fantasy league in all for the family. And I've only won once. In fact, I've had some pretty shabby showings as well.

Go ahead, laugh. But this is good for the league. The last thing the Loomer Family Fantasy League needs is a Yankees franchise with a built-in advantage.

It's great, great fun, and several sneaky lessons built in unsuspectingly. Here are the keys to the perfect family fantasy league:

1) Simple Draft. In our house, youngest drafts first and the oldest draft last. No snake draft, we go with the same order every round. Each round, we draft the same position. This knocks off a lot of the more complicated drafting strategy. No concerns about position scarcity or any of that crazy stuff. Everyone's picking a catcher in the first round. I also provide everyone with cheat sheets from ESPN.com so that there aren't any surprises about who is and isn't good. To avoid multi-position confusion, I also assigned a single position to all players.

2) Head to Head Scoring. Come on, you can't do Roto or Points Based with your family. It's just no fun. Even if a team is having a bad season, they can always look forward to taking on their brother or kicking their mama's butt. We go with H2H Categories, but only because I haven't thought of a good H2H Points system that is simple to understand and functional. I think H2H Points is better for football or even basketball, where you can make the final score seem like a real game score. We also make it so that each category is a win. No real reason. That's just how we roll.

3) No Transactions. When I say no transactions, I mean it: No Trades, No Waivers, No Lineup moves. In other words, No Bench -- everyone drafted will play. To some, this makes it boring. But again, we're playing with various levels of understanding here. There's a five-year-old playing. And I'm the only one logging in, so no one is putting in waiver claims. And since it's casual, I doubt we'll be checking our teams during the week (although P-Dubs has already been filling out some sheets of unknown purpose, so they may surprise me). And you know allowing trades is bound to cause problems. No vetoes, no arguments, just sharing a lot of love.

4) Everyone's in the Playoffs! I know, I know. This is dumb in a competitive league. But this isn't a competitive league. It's all for fun. We only have four teams, people. Having everyone make the playoffs actually backfired last football season when I won one game the entire regular season and won our Super Bowl. Of course, this inspired everyone to request the rule to be changed so that only the best two teams make the playoffs (you know this never would have been a request had such a miracle finish happened to anyone else!). Well, Yahoo! (our service of choice) has a four-team minimum. And since we only have four teams, our decision was either everyone's in or no playoffs. We've elected to stay with everyone's in. Even if the regular season means nothing, it's good to have that exciting final two weeks.

5) Make it Fun! Own it, baby. Every Monday morning following the week of match-ups, I'll gather everyone together so that I can announce the prior week's results. Plenty of suspense, of course. Sometimes I'll print off the results and post them in the family room. Play for some sort of prize. Doesn't have to be big, just something to make things interesting (and, no, I don't mean gamble). I think the greatest way to make it fun and instill baseball in your children is to watch games together. Make no mistake, this is a baseball family. We have the MLB Extra Innings Package (greatest purchase of all time). And while we will be watching mostly Brewers games, we'll pay close attention to who owns whom.

Loomer Family Draft Results
Sunday was an awesome day here in Colorado, so we took advantage of it by holding our draft in our driveway. Sat in a circle on lawn chairs, everyone with cheat sheets and pens in hand. I had my laptop on my lap, the Brewers game playing over my speakers while I logged the results in my incredibly awesome spreadsheet (you wish you had these spreadsheet skills!). We drafted 30 players (most allowed by Yahoo!), and the draft was over within an hour.

You'll note that P-Dubs, having the first pick, almost always went with the best Brewer. In some cases (Braun and Fielder), this wasn't such a bad strategy. In others (McGehee over A-Rod), it was not so smart.

Position	P-Dubs	Michael	Mama & JJ	Dada
C	Joe Mauer, MIN	Brian McCann, ATL	Jorge Posada, NYY	Victor Martinez, BOS
C	Russell Martin, LAD	Yadier Molina, STL	Geovany Soto, CHC	Matt Wieters, BAL
1B	Prince Fielder, MIL	Albert Pujols, STL	Miguel Cabrera, DET	Mark Teixeira, NYY
1B	Ryan Howard, PHI	Adrian Gonzalez, SD	Justin Morneau, MIN	Joey Votto, CIN
1B	Todd Helton, COL	Carlos Pena, TB	Nick Johnson, NYY	Kevin Youkilis, BOS
2B	Rickie Weeks, MIL	Chase Utley, PHI	Dustin Pedroia, BOS	Ian Kinsler, TEX
2B	Aaron Hill, TOR	Robinson Cano, NYY	Placido Polanco, PHI	Brandon Phillips, CIN
2B	Clint Barmes, COL	Brian Roberts, BAL	Luis Castillo, NYM	Ben Zobrist, TB
3B	Casey McGehee, MIL	Alex Rodriguez, NYY	Evan Longoria, TB	Pablo Sandoval, SF
3B	David Wright, NYM	Ryan Zimmerman, WAS	Aramis Ramirez, CHC	Chone Figgins, SEA
3B	Chipper Jones, ATL	Ian Stewart, COL	Adrian Beltre, BOS	Gordon Beckham, CHW
SS	Alcides Escobar, MIL	Hanley Ramirez, FLA	Troy Tulowitzki, COL	Jimmy Rollins, PHI
SS	Derek Jeter, NYY	Jose Reyes, NYM	J.J. Hardy, MIN	Yunel Escobar, ATL
SS	Miguel Tejada, BAL	Ryan Theriot, CHC	Alexei Ramirez, CHW	Elvis Andrus, TEX
OF	Ryan Braun, MIL	Carlos Gomez	Matt Holliday, STL	Matt Kemp, LAD
OF	Corey Hart, MIL	Carl Crawford, TB	Ichiro Suzuki, SEA	Justin Upton, ARI
OF	Dexter Fowler, COL	B.J. Upton, TB	Jason Bay, NYM	Jayson Werth, PHI
OF	Conor Jackson, ARI	Curtis Granderson, NYY	Adam Lind, TOR	Jacoby Ellsbury, BOS
OF	Carlos Lee, HOU	Manny Ramirez, LAD	Grady Sizemore, CLE	Adam Jones, BAL
OF	Ryan Ludwick, STL	Hunter Pence, HOU	Coco Crisp, OAK	Adam Dunn, WAS
OF	Seth Smith, COL	Cody Ross, FLA	Alfonso Soriano, CHC	Andre Ethier, LAD
OF	Andrew McCutchen, PIT	Josh Hamilton, TEX	Milton Bradley, SEA	Nick Markakis, BAL
SP	Yovani Gallardo, MIL	Tim Lincecum, SF	CC Sabathia, NYY	Roy Halladay, PHI
SP	Cole Hamels, PHI	Zack Greinke, KC	Johan Santana, NYM	Felix Hernandez, SEA
SP	Dan Haren, ARI	Adam Wainwright, STL	Javier Vazquez, NYY	Matt Cain, SF
SP	Ben Sheets, OAK	Cliff Lee, SEA	Justin Verlander, DET	Jon Lester, BOS
SP	Jake Peavy, CHW	Chris Carpenter, STL	Jorge De La Rosa, COL	Josh Johnson, FLA
SP	Josh Beckett, BOS	Ubaldo Jimenez, COL	Matt Garza, TB	Tommy Hanson, ATL
RP	Trevor Hoffman, MIL	Mariano Rivera, NYY	F. Rodriguez, NYM	J. Papelbon, BOS
RP	Todd Coffey, MIL	Huston Street, COL	Francisco Cordero, CIN	Jonathan Broxton, LAD

Giving Readers What They Want Since 2010

2010-03-25T17:07:00.001-06:00

I started this blog in late September of last year with no real vision. I don't like admitting that, but the fact is that it was mostly as a casual blog for me to share my thoughts.

Now that my readership has doubled to two, I think it's time to get serious. And to get serious, I need to focus.

You've probably noticed I've moved exclusively to baseball discussion lately. While I enjoy writing about fatherhood, technology, food and my lawn, I think it's important to be consistent so that both of you know what to expect. As a result, you'll soon notice some changes in the way this blog is structured.

Of course, just writing about baseball isn't going to bring readers. I need to have a unique angle and a strategy. And if you've been following lately, you're starting to see that come together. Here are a few things that are ongoing or I have planned for the near future:

@TippingPitches on Twitter: I originally only used my personal account, but I use that for too many reasons. With the new account, you now know exactly what to expect, and it offers value that you can't get in this blog (it's not just tweeting links here).
Awesome Baseball Names: Five times per day, featuring a new awesome baseball name from past and present (Twitter). There are about 400 names, and I have gone through about 150 so far. If you're good at math, you'll note that there are about 20,000 days of names left. Or maybe less.
Ranking baseball's all-time greatest hitters: I am working with a pool of about 10,000 and will begin revealing the results from the bottom. I have not yet determined what the bottom will be, but it may be 10,000. This way, we'll work our way up slowly. Either way, the rankings will replace Awesome Baseball Names once that list is complete.
Android App: Beginning yesterday, we have a free Android App available for those of you with such a phone. Quickly access blog entries and the TippingPitches Twitter feed in one place.
Hall of Very Good: As a result of the research I am doing, a comprehensive list will be compiled of baseball players who either deserve to be in the Hall of Fame but are not or players who were excellent but not quite good enough for the Hall. I've stumbled upon many names I was unfamiliar with before, and also amazed at how good some of these players were. These players need some recognition. Will be writing one blog entry per player, featuring in the "Awesome Baseball Names" manner on Twitter.

And now, I ask you, the reader(s). What do you want? Do you want more advanced statistics? More historical analysis? More focus on the current game and players (mostly ignored so far)? More Milwaukee Brewers (I love the Brewers, but don't know that I want to focus there only)? What specific features do you want? What subjects will keep you coming back? Let's brainstorm and make this the best possible blog for you.

Because you're awesome.

The Tipping Pitches Android App!

2010-03-24T17:03:00.008-06:00

It's official: Tipping Pitches is big time.

Ok, maybe not official, but we're working on it. Thanks to MotherApp.com, you can now add the Tipping Pitches app in the Android Market.

I think it's called the Android Market. I don't have an Android phone. I can't even install the app and see if it works well.

So, I rely on you, my one reader. I'm hoping you have an Android phone or this whole endeavor was a waste. Apparently I can't even link to it, that the only way you can get it is going to the Android Market.

[Seriously, Google, this is lame. I can link to iPhone apps.]

Anyway, add it and let me know what you think. It combines a feed of recent blog entries and the blog's Twitter updates into one place. This way, you always have access to nerdy baseball insights!

Feel free to provide some screen shots, give the app a high rating/review, or let me know what we can do to make it better. Gotta be honest. Not much flexibility. But I still listen because I care.

Previewing the 2010 Milwaukee Brewers

2010-03-24T09:36:00.004-06:00

I had to do this eventually, right? I have lived and breathed the Brewers since my early years as a baseball fan. In fact, I'd say I became a Brewers fan before I became a baseball fan.

The challenge of such a preview is remaining objective. As a fan, you have to be optimistic. And it's easy to get defensive when you feel that others in the media are slighting your team. As a result, you can overcompensate by being unrealistically optimistic.

That said, I tend to pride myself on my ability to remain objective. Of course, I haven't always been that way. I still remember being a displaced Brewers fan in Michigan, sending Mitch Albom a 20 page print-out of my predictions for the 1987 season. Of course, the Brewers were going to win the World Series and sweep the MVP, Cy Young and Rookie of the Year awards. They were just so talented!

It didn't work out for those Brewers, but I was in seventh grade then. I'm objective now. I'm a stat guy, and you lose your soul as a stat guy. I don't base performance on intangibles, guts or chemistry. I try to see the players for what they are.

So let's do this.

Starting Rotation
Ouch, did I have to start here? Major sore spot last season. The Brewers finished dead last in the Majors in starting pitching ERA in 2009. That's pretty freaking bad, especially considering they play in the National League without the DH.

But let's be objective. Yovani Gallardo, the team's ace, had his first full season in the bigs. He was part brilliant and sometimes erratic, finishing with a very respectable 204 strikeouts and 3.73 ERA. The opposition batted a mere .219 off of him.

Although Gallardo's numbers were strong, he was spectacular in the first half. Prior to the All-Star break, he had a 3.22 ERA and walked 55 batters in 114 2/3 innings pitched (4.3/nine). After the break, Gallardo's ERA ballooned to 4.56. Control was his biggest problem, walking 39 in 71 innings (4.9/nine). Batters also hit 40 points higher off of him in the second half.

Most people are high on Gallardo. Most realize that he is only getting better. Most understand that he was likely tired in the second half. He'll take a step forward this season.

After Gallardo, the rotation was ugly in 2009. Braden Looper won 14 games but with a 5.22 ERA. No pitcher with more than four starts, other than Gallardo, finished with a starting ERA under 5.00. In fact, the four pitchers after Suppan who made more than four starts all had ERA's over 6.00.

Braden Looper is gone. Let's get one thing straight: Jeff Suppan isn't good. If the Brewers decide to start him again, they can expect nothing better than his 2009 performance. Anything under a 5.00 ERA would be a major miracle.

However, unlike last season, the Brewers are not forced to start Suppan. They may in the beginning, but all indications are that it would be as the fifth starter. Unlike last season, they actually have the depth to replace him if necessary.

Dave Bush is a serviceable back of the rotation starter, and looked strong last season before getting hit on the elbow by a Hanley Ramirez line drive. Prior to the 2009 debacle when his ERA swelled to 6.38, you could typically expect something in the mid to low 4's from him.

Manny Parra has been 90% potential and 10% production so far in his career. At 27, this is the year he either becomes a solid starter or starts bouncing from team to team, minor league team to minor league team. He has the stuff to break out, but it's difficult to expect much from him. That said, it's still very easy to put money on an improvement over his 2009 ERA of 6.36.

Chris Narveson made four starts at the end of last season for a 3.38 ERA. He is the dark horse and is unlikely to start the season in the rotation. However, he's a lefty who shows promise and should at least be a decent arm out of the pen.

Still, not a lot to hang your hat on outside of Gallardo.

Wait! Two new veteran arms have been added to the rotation in Randy Wolf and Doug Davis. Wolf enjoyed what was possibly a career year in 2009 with the Dodgers, finishing with a solid 3.23 ERA. After John Lackey, he may have been the best free agent pitcher available. Doug Davis isn't pretty to watch, but he eats innings and can expect to bring you a low to mid 4 ERA.

Wolf and Davis may not be ace material, but they are certainly upgrades over Braden Looper and the slew of fill-ins the Brewers trotted out to the mound last season. For the first time in many years, they have depth, and they expect to go into the season with seven pitchers ready to start, moving the two who don't make the rotation to the bullpen.

Will they have one of the top rotations in baseball? Unlikely. But this rotation is being grossly underestimated. Gallardo, by all accounts, is ready to become an elite pitcher. Wolf and Davis are quality starters. And given the depth, it is unlikely they will be stuck with pitchers with ERA's well north of 5.00 in 2010.

Prognosis: I expect the Brewers rotation to be middle of the pack in the National League, which is a major improvement over 2009.

Projected Rotation:

Yovani Gallardo
Randy Wolf
Doug Davis
Dave Bush
Jeff Suppan (initially), Manny Parra (eventually)

The top three are automatic. I keep coming back to Dave Bush for the fourth spot. He is the most dependable and the most experienced of those who have promise. Jeff Suppan may get an initial shot, but I'd expect him to have a short leash. He'll get very few starts in April as the fifth starter, and will probably be given two or three chances to prove he deserves it. If he fails (likely), Parra or Chris Narveson will move in. For the long haul, I think Parra is ready for the job.

Bullpen
The Brewers bullpen finished with a respectable 3.97 ERA in 2009, which was 16th in all of baseball (tenth in the National League). However, it should be noted that only the Dodgers' and Padres' bullpens threw more innings. For the Brewers, this was because of a lack of production from the starters. With starting pitching expected to improve in 2010, the bullpen is less likely to get overextended.

The changes aren't all that significant here, but the Brewers didn't need to make wholesale changes. Trevor Hoffman, who had 37 saves and a minuscule 1.83 ERA in 2009, will continue to anchor the pen. Work horse Todd Coffey appeared in 78 games, finishing with a 2.90 ERA and 1.16 WHIP in 2009. Lefty specialist Mitch Stetter was simply unhittable against left handed hitters, having a .178 BAA from that side of the plate.

These are three solid relief pitchers. However, it is difficult to expect this level of performance from any of these three again in 2010. Hoffman is 42 and will turn 43 in October. He relies entirely on location and fooling hitters with his changeup since his fastball is an offspeed pitch in the arsenal of most. He may be great again this season. But it would not be surprising if a sharp decline occurs.

The Brewers did add veteran LaTroy Hawkins to the pen, and he will provide stability as well as another option to close games when Hoffman needs the inevitable breather. No one knows what to expect from Carlos Villanueva, who may start the year in the minors since he has an option and the Brewers seem determined to move their extra starters to the bullpen.

Those extra starters not only provide depth to the rotation but depth to the bullpen. Additionally, the Brewers have something waiting that they haven't had in some time: a legit relief prospect in Zach Braddock, who is ready to go whenever he is needed. Braddock sparkled in 2009 and has shown he belongs this spring. He simply needs the opportunity to pitch.

Prognosis: Overall, I see the Brewers' relief pitching remaining about the same. They had some pitchers over perform in 2009, but there is added depth in 2010 that did not previously exist. The bullpen has a high ceiling, but a reasonable expectation is for little change this season.

Projected Bullpen:

Trevor Hoffman (Closer)
LaTroy Hawkins (Set-up)
Todd Coffey
Mitch Stetter (Lefty Specialist)
Claudio Vargas
Chris Narveson
Manny Parra/Jeff Suppan

Waiting:

Carlos Villanueva
Chris Smith
Zach Braddock
Chuck Lofgren
John Axford

This is the most logical scenario, assuming the Brewers stick with Suppan throughout the season and don't eat his salary. Villanueva is the odd man out, though he gets the quick call as soon as injury strikes. Zach Braddock has shown signs that he will dominate at the big league level. Don't be surprised to see him sooner rather than later if a lefty goes down. Mark Rogers may see some big league time if he continues to progress, but in all likelihood it won't be until September call-ups.

Offense
Scoring runs was not a problem for the Brewers in 2009. In fact, it was the only reason a team with the worst rotation in baseball was able to finish with a respectable 80 wins. Anchored by one of the best middle of the lineup duos in all of baseball in Ryan Braun and Prince Fielder, the Brewers finished third in the National League with 182 home runs and 785 runs scored.

Barring an injury, we know what to expect from Braun and Fielder. Both will hit somewhere around .300 with 35 to 45 home runs and 110 to 125 runs batted in.

After these two, however, little is certain. Casey McGehee emerged as a surprising source of offense in 2009, leading all rookies with 16 home runs. Given he accomplished this in a partial season and hit .301, can he maintain this level of performance over an entire season? It's unlikely, but the Brewers would gladly accept a .275 average and 20 home runs from their third baseman.

While the Brewers of the past scored via the home run, the 2010 iteration will score in multiple ways, assuming they get on base. Gone are Mike Cameron and JJ Hardy. In are youngsters Alcides Escobar and Carlos Gomez. While both have blinding speed and will steal bases this season, only Escobar has proven (albeit in limited time) that he can hit Major League pitching. Gomez, with a lifetime OBP of .292 in 348 games, has plenty of room to grow. Will he?

It's unknown what Hardy will do this season in Minnesota, but it is likely that Escobar will at least match his play at the plate in 2009. Once a powerful shortstop, Hardy was a major disappointment in 2009, hitting .229 with 11 home runs and spending the final month of the season in the minors.

Also gone is Jason Kendall, possibly the weakest hitting regular in all of baseball. It is highly likely that anything provided by veteran Gregg Zaun and his yet-to-be-determined back-up will be an improvement over Kendall's putrid offensive performance.

Rickie Weeks was on his way to a break-out season in 2009 before undergoing the second wrist surgery of his career. Weeks was the driving force behind a strong Brewers start, hitting nine home runs in 37 games and boasting the second highest OPS among second basemen behind Chase Utley to that point. All indications are that Weeks is completely healthy, but fans are cautiously optimistic. Even if he does not perform at the level he set in his short stint last season, a healthy Rickie Weeks will provide the Brewers a major boost. And all signs from spring training are that a healthy Rickie Weeks will be a productive Rickie Weeks.

A major sore spot in the lineup last season and heading into 2010 is right fielder Corey Hart. An All-Star in 2007, Hart is now a below average performer, both offensively and defensively. Prior to suffering a season ending appendectomy, Hart hit a mere .260 with a .335 OBP and 12 home runs in 115 games. Hart has become susceptible to the slider low and away, and does not appear to have improved in that area this spring. While he is adding a new pair of prescription goggles to his ensemble, most Brewer fans are pessimistic about any chance of re-emergence in 2010.

The bench may be a major strength for the Brewers this season. Craig Counsell had a career year in 2009, and proved very valuable as a replacement for Rickie Weeks. Now that Weeks is healthy, Counsell can once again come off the bench. Acquired for Tony Gwynn, Jr. early in 2009, Jody Gerut seemed like a lost cause prior to the All-Star break. However, most fans failed to notice he was quite productive during the second half. He could spell or even challenge Hart for his position in right field.

A potentially valuable addition to the outfield is Jim Edmonds. Though he has been out of baseball for a year, he does not appear to have lost his strike zone awareness or bat speed. He is still a solid outfielder and will provide a good left handed bat off of the bench in addition to competition for time in right field and center, depending on how Hart and Gomez do.

Prognosis: Braun and Fielder make this team go. While there are more question marks in 2010, there is depth to cover for struggling or injured players. Speed will add a dimension, but the question will be whether those fleetest of foot (Gomez and Escobar) will get on base to use it. Ultimately, the key ingredient to this offense may be Rickie Weeks. If he is healthy, the Brewers will score runs at a high level.

Overall, a realistic expectation is for a minor drop-off. Less power, more speed, more mistakes from young players, and questions about health. Corey Hart needs to step up or risk losing his job.

Projected Lineup:

Rickie Weeks (2B)
Alcides Escobar (SS)
Ryan Braun (LF)
Prince Fielder (1B)
Casey McGehee (3B)
Corey Hart (RF)
Gregg Zaun (C)
Carlos Gomez (CF)
Pitcher

Bench:

Craig Counsell (2B, 3B, SS)
Joe Inglett (Utility)
Jim Edmonds (CF, RF)
Jody Gerut (CF, RF)
George Kattaras (C)

Waiting:

Mat Gamel (3B)
Jonathan LuCroy (C)
Eric Farris (2B)
Adam Heether (3B)
Lorenzo Cain (CF)

I wonder if Gamel would have made the roster even if he hadn't gotten hurt. The Brewers have a very solid veteran bench, and Gamel needs to get his at bats in the minors. In the event an injury strikes or McGehee is unable to follow up a solid rookie season, Gamel will get the first call. If Corey Hart and/or Carlos Gomez struggle, Lorenzo Cain is climbing the ranks quickly and should be ready to make the jump. Possibly the organization's best prospect, second baseman Brett Lawrie is still a year or two away.

Defense
I'll spare you the UZR stats, but the Brewers were not a good defensive team in 2009. The only area they could have been considered above average was in center field and shortstop, but both Cameron and Hardy are now gone.

That said, it is entirely possible that the Brewers replaced both players with youngsters who are defensively superior. Both have the potential to be elite with the glove and cover an amazing amount of ground at their positions. The question, of course, is whether both players are able to hit in order to maintain a firm hold on their starting spots. It's likely that Escobar will, particularly since he has little competition. Gomez, however, may not be able to display his defensive tools on a daily basis.

While Fielder and Braun are elite offensive players, they are below average in the field. That said, Fielder did make strides last season (from terrible to acceptable) and Braun was still learning the outfield a year ago after a switch from third base. Braun is a terrific athlete and has the potential to be an above average defender. Realistically, he may become average in 2010.

Casey McGehee arrived in camp a year ago with the reputation as a solid glove man, but he failed to deliver in the field. He brought back memories of Braun in 2007, but unfortunately for McGehee those memories were in the field. He was one of the worst defenders at his position a year ago, though in his defense McGehee did suffer with bum knees throughout the season. It is possible that a healthy Casey McGehee will be improved in the field.

Rickie Weeks was making strides in the field before getting injured last season, but he is an average defender at best. Gregg Zaun provides no improvement over Kendall behind the plate, and Corey Hart is Corey Hart. The Brewers get better defensively if they swap out Hart for Gerut or Edmonds.

Prognosis: If defense wins championships, the Brewers are in trouble. While the potential is there to be a better defensive team in 2010, quite a bit needs to go right. Rickie Weeks needs to remain healthy and continue to improve with the glove. Ryan Braun and Prince Fielder can't level off. Casey McGehee has to prove that last season's defensive deficiencies were injury related. And both Escobar and Gomez need to establish themselves offensively to utilize their defensive skills.

Overall, I see no improvement here with a greater possibility for a drop-off than for improvement. They can improve as a defensive unit, but there are too many factors to make it a good bet.

Final Assessment
I'm not real sure why, but the media seems to be down on the Brewers this season. While there is potential for very minor regression on offense, in the bullpen and on defense, the only obvious change is in the rotation, where there will be noticeable improvement. They won 80 games a year ago with the worst starting pitching in baseball. Everything went wrong with that rotation. Based on the development of Gallardo and acquisitions of Wolf and Davis, the odds are greatly stacked in favor of a major improvement. And given the rotation's new depth, the back of the rotation is unlikely to again have pitchers with ERA's over 6.00.

While I don't see the bullpen improving, the new strength of the rotation will help keep the bullpen fresh. There is some potential for drop-off, but the Brewers are set up for a solid, if unspectacular and average, pitching staff.

The offense and defense have some question marks, but the changes since last season are minimal. Braun and Fielder still man the middle. Complementary players help, but the two big guys ultimately make this team go.

I don't see the Brewers faring worse in 2010 than they did in 2009, and this is a fully objective assessment. They have weaknesses, but they are stronger and deeper as a team than they were last season. They will no longer need to win games 8-7. They now have good enough pitching that their offense will win more close games.

I can't predict what the Cubs and Cardinals will do. The Cardinals are the media darlings. People see Pujols and Holliday as an unstoppable force, even though Holliday appeared suspect in Oakland prior to his trade to St. Louis. He will not duplicate his performance. And while he's bound to be dominant if healthy, health is always the question with Chris Carpenter.

The Cubs are bound to rip their fans' hearts out once again. They've done little to improve their roster. It's fun to watch them implode. They do have good enough pitching, however, that will keep them competitive.

Will these teams finish ahead of the Brewers? I don't know. But there will be competitive baseball in Milwaukee this season, and I expect an improvement over 2009. Though predictions are vastly overrated and largely meaningless, I project 85 wins for the Brewers. Hopefully that will be enough for a Wild Card berth.

The Absurdity of Quality

2010-03-23T17:49:00.004-06:00

Joe Mauer and Hanley Ramirez were the 2009 American and National League batting champions. Did they deserve the honor?

Carlos Pena, with 37 home runs, was the 2009 home run king. Even though Albert Pujols smacked 47.

Absurd, right? But Pena averaged a home run in every 12.08 at bats compared to 12.09 for Pujols. So Pena hit home runs more often. And since Pena had at least 3.1 plate appearances per Tampa Bay game, he qualified to be the home run champ based on his exceptional rate.

This is sarcasm, of course. But what is the difference between making such a claim and awarding the "Batting Champ" in the same way?

When evaluating season-long performance, isn't the end game -- total accumulation -- ultimately what is most important? Would you rather have a player who finished with more home runs or who had the higher home run rate? I've never understood why we analyze statistics so inconsistently. Why is rate important for batting but not for home runs?

Don't get me wrong, there are times when "quality" over "quantity" makes sense. If a batter hit 10 home runs in 30 games but missed the rest of the season due to injury, it's good to know his home run rate when evaluating his ability. And you can't just say the best pitcher was the one who gave up the fewest runs since the crown would go to a pitcher who barely played.

But there are so many reasons to hate the crowning of a player based on quality stats. In a typical season, a player needs only about 503 plate appearances (3.1 X 162 games) to qualify for the batting championship (which, of course, is awarded to the player with the highest batting average). Accounting for walks, hit by pitch and sacrifices, the typical player with 503 plate appearances would record 445 at bats.

It should be noted that Prince Fielder, the only hitter who played 162 games last season, had 719 plate appearances and 591 at bats, more than a difference of 200 plate appearances and nearly 150 at bats over the above example.

Let's assume the player with 445 at bats hit .350 and was crowned batting champion. Let's assume there was another player with 591 at bats who hit .345. The batting champion recorded 156 hits while the runner-up had 204.

What sense does this make? The problem is that when we draw an imaginary, arbitrary line to qualify for this honor, we anoint all above that line as equals. In reality, they are not.

To put it another way, a hitter could bat .450 and collect 200 hits in 444 at bats but lose the batting title to a hitter who batted .350 (or worse) and collected 156 hits in 445 at bats.

While these are extreme examples, I think we can all agree that a .325 batting average in 503 plate appearances does not equal a .325 batting average in 700 plate appearances. The player who maintained that level of play longer was more valuable.

Comparing the players with identical batting averages is relatively easy. But at what point is a player with a lower batting average more valuable? You could apply a formula like (Player Average - League Average) X Plate Appearances, but I doubt we'll ever do that in the mainstream. It gets fuzzy in a hurry, and instead we just get sloppy with analysis.

The home run champion is not always the player with the highest home run rate. The RBI champion is not always the player with the highest RBI rate. Why, then, is the batting champion the player with the highest hitting rate?

I'd actually suggest that this problem of lazy statistical analysis goes much deeper, and that we overvalue the hit while ignoring other ways a player gets on base. While statistics like On Base Percentage are finally gaining acceptance as a conventional statistic that many see as more valuable than Batting Average, we completely ignore the cumulative On Base statistic (Hits + Walks + Hit By Pitch).

Joe Mauer was the AL batting champ with a .365 batting average, and Hanley Ramirez led the NL at .342. Yet four players in the American League accumulated more hits than Mauer (led by Ichiro with 225 and 34 more than Mauer). Two players (led by Ryan Braun's 203) had more hits than Hanley Ramirez in the National League. And if you want to focus on times on base, five players reached more than Mauer's 269 in the AL (led by Derek Jeter's 289) while six players exceeded Ramirez's 267 (led by Albert Pujols' 310).

Batting average has value, but should it be the factor that determines the batting champion? And if not, who should have been the batting champion for each league in 2009? It would seem that arguments could be made for Jeter and Ichiro in the AL and Braun and Pujols in the NL.

Twins Ink Joe Mauer to Death Sentence

2010-03-22T21:14:00.003-06:00

The Minnesota Twins had a total payroll of about $67 Million in 2009, giving them the 24th highest payroll in baseball according to USAToday.com. From the year 2000 on, the Twins have never been in the top half of the league in payroll, topping out at 18th with $71.4 Million in salaries in 2007.

Today, the Twins locked up local star Joe Mauer to an eight year extension paying him $184 Million.

This is a move motivated by emotion. It's a feel good story. The local boy with the pristine image and sweet swing had to stay. The Twins simply could not let him leave for the big market Yankees or Red Sox. They had to lock him up now.

Or so it seemed.

It's a dangerous, dangerous move for a team like the Twins. And as a small market baseball fan, I hate the precedent that it sets. It tells small market fans that they can and should sign their stars. It tells the small market teams that they, too, can throw their money around.

But I just don't think this move is going to end well for the Twins and their fans. This doesn't mean Mauer isn't a great player. He is. He's won three batting titles and an MVP award. He's the best catcher in the game. He combines power and average from the left side of the plate.

And he is also going to make $23 Million per season for a team that has only twice spent three times that on an entire payroll. Mauer is also a catcher playing in a new cold climate, open air stadium. In other words, there will be plenty of postponed games leading to numerous double headers. For a catcher, this means Mauer cannot be expected to play 140 games (as it is, he barely hit that total twice in five full seasons).

We also don't know how the new stadium will impact Mauer's production. We know he'll be very good. But playing outdoors, unprotected from the elements he will face this season and in the future during April could significantly curtail his numbers.

But even if he maintains this level of production, it's an incredible risk for a team like the Twins. As it is, Minnesota is a very good team that is regularly a playoff candidate. Quite remarkable for a small market team.

However, the reason they are so good is that Mauer is such a bargain that the Twins can surround him and star Justin Morneau with decent (even if inexpensive) players. However, Morneau's salary increases to $14 Million this season and will remain at that level through 2013. Very soon, the Twins will be spending $37 Million on two players.

Target Field will bring some more revenue. But can the Twins afford to spend $16 Million more while maintaining the rest of their roster? Does it make sense to spend $23 Million a year (and tie up close to $200 Million in all) on a catcher who will not play every day and is likely to see his skills diminish early if he doesn't change positions?

Mauer may be worth this kind of money. He may be worth more. But he's worth that much money to the Yankees, Red Sox, and other teams who can afford to shell out that type of coin on one player. They can also surround such a player with several other high dollar athletes. Such a move will not hinder the Yankees' ability to build a competitive team around him.

If the Yankees signed Mauer and he gets hurt, the Yankees would just go get someone else. Swallow the loss and move on.

If Mauer gets hurt under the Twins' control, the franchise is crippled through the end of his contract. It's a death sentence.

The question for me is whether the Twins can actually get better by signing Mauer. I see this along the same lines of the talk of the Brewers inking Prince Fielder to a long term contract. The Brewers' best chance to win is with Prince Fielder, but at his current salary (and prior salary). In reality, their best chance to win was in 2008. Every time his salary goes up, the Brewers' chance to win diminishes.

Same with the Twins and Mauer. If they didn't win a World Series before with Mauer, their chances are no better now with him under a long-term contract. In fact, unless the Twins start shelling out big dollars and up their payroll to the $90-$100 Million range in the near future, the likelihood of the Twins winning has suddenly decreased by making the signing. Surrounding Mauer and Morneau with quality players is much more difficult. Pressure is on the farm system.

Maybe the new stadium will be the difference maker. Maybe the Twins will become a mid to large market team. But a stadium is only "new" for a couple of years. If the Twins, for whatever reason, do not compete with Mauer, will the fans continue to pay his salary?

Is this a nice story for the Twins and their fans on the surface? Sure it is. All teams need to have the ability to keep their prized players. But beyond the joy felt today, I see little upside in the move. If the signing succeeds and Mauer lives up to the contract, it tells small market teams and their fans that they need to make this type of risk to compete. If it fails, the Twins implode.

My preference would be that Mauer go to free agency and be awarded to the highest bidder. We need more examples of why the current system is terrible for small market teams. But when small market teams foolishly attempt to act like big market teams, it's counter productive. It sets the league back and lowers the likelihood of any type of financial reform in the near future.

Ranking the Best: Status

2010-03-21T23:01:00.003-06:00

Many people (even if they are imagined) are begging to know where I am in the process of ranking the most dominant hitters in baseball history from one to 500 (and possibly far beyond). Have I given up? No way. Just putting in a whole lot of work.

I have created some 84 spreadsheets, totaling more than 1.5 GB of file space, to help me with this analysis. And all 84 have helped me to created the final, oh-so-important document.

I call it the RankingEngine. Yes, it's not the coolest name. But when you create 84 documents, you'd better name each file properly so that you can keep them straight. This is the doc that will get me to the promised land.

This doc has the records of nearly 10,000 hitters dating back to 1871, focusing on 23 offensive statistics (not including such things as games, plate appearances and at bats. Additionally, I have found the league average for each player in each season and compared all players' annual performance to that average player to create a ratio against the theoretical average player.

I've also compiled these ratios to determine each player's best one, two, three, four, five, down to 25 seasons in each statistic compared to the average. Which player had the best five home run seasons against the league average? Was a different player better over 10 years? Fifteen? This part of the analysis is critical when comparing players.

There is also a look at each player's performance for their entire career versus the league average. This is done in two ways -- 1) comparing how the average player would do over the course of the player's career with the same number of plate appearances, and 2) comparing the player's performance to the theoretical average starting player, which includes considering how many plate appearances that average player would have had.

Everything I've laid out so far is split into separate tabs within one document. It's static, 24 tabs. But the dynamic portion is where the magic starts.

I've created a final tab that allows me to select any two players and compare them. Take a look at the screen grab to the right to get a better idea.

Crazy stuff, right? In this case, we're comparing the careers of Craig Counsell and Jim Gantner (don't want to give away any surprises, so we're starting with some scrappy old vets). The main body of the sheet compares the two players in each category starting with the best season and finishing with the 25 best seasons. The higher ratio will appear green, the lower ratio red to help with quick comparisons (black italics indicates a player did not play this many seasons and is therefore no longer accumulating statistics).

However, I also make it easier by reviewing the number of "wins" each player has in best five, 10, 15, 20 and total years at the top. Additionally, I found it necessary to isolate the "important" statistics so that my analysis wasn't improperly skewed.

While I will look at all 23 stats, my main focus will be on the following 12:

Runs
Home Runs
Runs Batted In
Stolen Bases
On Base Percentage
Total On Base (Walks + Hits + Hit By Pitch)
All Total Bases (Total Bases + Walks + Hit By Pitch)
Slugging Percentage based on All Total Bases (over Plate Appearances)
Equivalent Average
wOBA
Runs Created
OPS+

It's a nice mixture of conventional, advanced, and my own concoction (though my concoctions are very minor variations of conventional statistics). You'll notice that I find little value in hits and batting average, preferring On Base and On Base Percentage instead. Additionally, I have scrapped Total Bases and Slugging Percentage for versions that include walks and hit by pitch.

Keep in mind that some of the more advanced statistics (EqA, wOBA, OPS+) need to be recreated. We often see a final version that accounts for park effects. I don't think this will be possible for my analysis. In the example of EqA, I am using Raw EqA for this very reason. I have recreated these statistics the best that I can and have found that I am very close to published statistics. I continue to tweak these stats, so if anyone has any advice on how to make them more precise, please let me know.

I am comparing player by player. You bet, this is going to take some time. But I feel this is the best way to do it as opposed to coming up with some master formula to determine how players should be ranked. Instead, I am taking multiple factors into consideration. It's not a vacuum. So I will be looking at top five years separately from top 10, top 15 separately from top 20. And each statistic is not created equal.

In some cases, it will be easy. If Player A is better than Player B in 95% of the metrics, I know my answer for how those two will be ranked. Anything under around 70% will need to be more closely scrutinized.

So far, I've had a lot of fun ranking 40 players. While some players don't fall where I'd expect (or even want) them to fall, I am determined to stick to the stats and not be biased by perception, loyalties or popularity. I am keeping examples of this vague so as not to give any results away.

What was originally a weekend project turned into a one or two week project to one that I will work on indefinitely. This may take several months. And while I work on it, I will keep the results close to the vest for two reasons: 1) it's fun to unveil the results bit by bit, and 2) I want to make sure that all results are final before revealing anything.

In the meantime, I'd love to get opinions on what you think of the path I'm taking. Do you agree with the statistical categories that are the focus of my analysis? Do you have any recommendations on how I might recreate advanced statistics for historical data most accurately?

Most Dominant Home Run Hitters: Greatest Season

2010-03-11T21:27:00.004-07:00

It's very easy to get swept away by totals when considering the "best ever." We generally consider the best home run seasons ever to be Bonds' 73, McGwire's 70, the gaggle of steroid 60s, Maris' 61 and Ruth's 60. We fail to provide any context to those numbers.

We do the same with Pete Rose's career hits. Hank Aaron's career home runs. Hack Wilson's single season RBI record. Ted Williams' .406.

The truth is, however, that each player's feat only has meaning for that particular season. You can't take that number out of context and compare it to another, unadjusted number from a different season.

What is dominance? It's quality, and it's distance between the player and the league average. The league average for a quantitative stat is found by multiplying the league rate (total home runs, for example, over total plate appearances) by the average starting player's plate appearances. I will refer to the ratio of player's home runs to league average as HR+.

The league average for home runs has been as high as 16.3 in 2000 and as low as 3.6 in 1920. In other words, the value of 15 home runs is far different in 2000 than it was in 1920. As such a number obviously needs context when determining worth, the same needs to be done for the gaudy numbers.

For the purpose of this analysis, I have eliminated all candidates prior to 1920 (known as the Dead Ball Era). While it is important to recognize a great 10 home run season when the average is two or fewer, it is also difficult to compare such a season to modern day totals. One lucky or inside the park home run significantly alters such a player's ratio, whereas it makes virtually no impact now.

The Greatest Season Ever

It is likely no surprise that this season is owned by Babe Ruth. While there is some debate over when the Dead Ball Era ended (either 1920 or 1921, depending on whom you talk to), Babe Ruth had the most dominant season regardless. In fact, Ruth owns the five most dominant post-1919 home run seasons ever, six of the top eight, seven of the top nine, and eight of the top 12. Again, just a reminder: This doesn't even include his short though dominant seasons prior to 1920 when he was also a pitcher and played during the Dead Ball Era.

1. Babe Ruth, 1920, 54 home runs vs. 3.6 league average (14.9 HR+)
Ruth alone hit more home runs in 1920 than any other team in the American League and all but the Philadelphia Phillies (with 60, led by Cy Williams' 15) in the National League. If that isn't enough context for you, it would be the equivalent of Barry Bonds hitting 234 home runs in 2001.

2. Babe Ruth, 1927, 60 home runs vs. 5.1 league average (11.7 HR+)
You'd think that seven years later the rest of the league would be catching up to Ruth. Not really. The Babe still hit more home runs than 12 of the other teams in the league.

3. Babe Ruth, 1921, 59 home runs vs. 5.4 league average (10.9 HR+)
Teammate Bob Meusel was second to Ruth in 1921, tied with Ken Williams of the St. Louis Browns with 24. Only three others hit 20.

4. Babe Ruth, 1926, 47 home runs vs. 4.8 league average (9.8 HR+)
From 1918 through 1926, there were only two years in which Ruth did not lead league in home runs (both times led instead by Rogers Hornsby in 1922 and 1925). Ruth became the game's single season home run king in 1919 (when he was still a part-time pitcher) and didn't lose the crown until 1961.

5. Babe Ruth, 1924, 46 home runs vs. 5.0 league average (9.3 HR+)
It was a typical season for Ruth, who led the league in Runs, Home Runs, Walks, Batting Average, On Base Percentage, Slugging Percentage and Total Bases. No Triple Crown, I guess, but eight categories ain't bad.

The rest of the Top 10:

6. Lou Gehrig, 1927, 47 home runs vs. 5.1 league average (9.2 HR+)
7. Babe Ruth, 1928, 54 home runs vs. 6.0 league average (8.9 HR+)
8T. Lou Gehrig, 1931, 46 home runs vs. 5.9 league average (7.8 HR+)
8T. Babe Ruth, 1931, 46 home runs vs. 5.9 league average (7.8 HR+)
10. Jimmie Foxx, 1933, 48 home runs vs. 6.2 league average (7.8 HR+)

Sports: The Awesome Baseball Names

2010-03-09T14:24:00.005-07:00

Those of you following @TippingPitches on Twitter know about my "Awesome Baseball Names" feature. Five times per day, I tweet a famous or not-so-famous (though undeniably awesome) baseball name.

Following are the most recent names that have been shared so far. There are a good 300 or so more on the way:

Jim 'Sarge' Bagby
Bill 'Blue Sleeve' Harper
Boob 'Gink' Fowler

Harry 'Harry The Cat' Brecheen
Loren 'Bee Bee' Babe
Kid 'Sunshine' McLaughlin
Joe 'Bananas' Benes
Johnny 'Peaches' Werhas
Hinkey Haines
Charlie 'Hummer' DeArmond

Expecting a baby and considering a baseball inspired name? Start here. If you don't care much for originality, go with Lefty, Red, Dutch, Doc or Buck. I encourage you to dig deeper. There's some baseball nickname gold buried in the depths.

They just don't make baseball nicknames the way they once did (though, it's good they no longer do in some of the racially insensitive cases). Special thanks to BaseballReference.com and Sean Lahman for providing easy access to this information.

Below are all of the names that have occurred more than once through 2006 along with the number of times the name has occurred. Which are your favorites?

Lefty - 181
Red - 145
Doc - 82
Dutch - 66
Buck - 51
Bud - 42
Chick - 36
Cy - 34
Whitey - 34
Buddy - 31
Babe - 29
Kid - 29
Butch - 25
Chief - 25
Tex - 25
Moose - 24
Heinie - 23
Pop - 23
Duke - 20
Buster - 19
Deacon - 19
Rip - 19
Rod - 19
Junior - 18
Big Bill - 17
Woody - 17
Rusty - 16
Big Ed - 15
Rabbit - 15
Slim - 15
King - 14
Ducky - 13
Dusty - 13
Happy - 13
Jumbo - 13
Rocky - 13
Sheriff - 13
Dixie - 12
Moe - 12
Pep - 12
Swede - 12
Wild Bill - 12
Blackie - 11
Bull - 11
Hub - 11
Nig - 11
Pinky - 11
Shorty - 11
Ace - 10
Bunny - 10
Buzz - 10
Hack - 10
Hawk - 10
Homer - 10
Paddy - 10
Smokey - 10
Bo - 9
Bucky - 9
Cap - 9
Cotton - 9
Count - 9
Ham - 9
Irish - 9
Mack - 9
Mule - 9
Patsy - 9
Pepper - 9
Skip - 9
Baldy - 8
Big Jim - 8
Bubba - 8
Bugs - 8
Dummy - 8
Flash - 8
Hooks - 8
Lucky - 8
Skeeter - 8
Sonny - 8
Tiny - 8
Chink - 7
Farmer - 7
Hi - 7
Jocko - 7
Judge - 7
Rebel - 7
Skinny - 7
Slats - 7
Specs - 7
Spike - 7
Stubby - 7
Tug - 7
Wee Willie - 7
Win - 7
Biff - 6
Candy - 6
Curly - 6
Dad - 6
Frenchy - 6
Gabby - 6
Huck - 6
Iron Man - 6
Mac - 6
Muscles - 6
Porky - 6
Preacher - 6
Slick - 6
Sparky - 6
Stretch - 6
Broadway - 5
Cannonball - 5
Chappie - 5
Chip - 5
Con - 5
Dandy - 5
Dizzy - 5
Dode - 5
Germany - 5
Gibby - 5
Hap - 5
Happy Jack - 5
Honest John - 5
Hoot - 5
Jiggs - 5
Monk - 5
Nap - 5
Newt - 5
Pug - 5
Rock - 5
Roxy - 5
Sarge - 5
Scrap Iron - 5
Shotgun - 5
Smoke - 5
Speed - 5
Sunny Jim - 5
Baby - 4
Bear - 4
Birdie - 4
Bobo - 4
Boots - 4
Bub - 4
Buckshot - 4
Bulldog - 4
Chicken - 4
Colonel - 4
Corky - 4
Cowboy - 4
Dallas - 4
Dasher - 4
Deerfoot - 4
Fats - 4
Fireman - 4
Flip - 4
Foghorn - 4
German - 4
Ginger - 4
Goat - 4
Hook - 4
Hy - 4
Izzy - 4
Little Joe - 4
Mouse - 4
Moxie - 4
Mutt - 4
Old Hoss - 4
Ox - 4
Peaches - 4
Peanuts - 4
Polly - 4
Pudge - 4
Sad Sam - 4
Schoolboy - 4
Scoops - 4
Silent John - 4
Silver - 4
Slug - 4
Snake - 4
Socks - 4
Solly - 4
Soup - 4
Spanky - 4
Spec - 4
Spider - 4
Spud - 4
Sugar - 4
T-Bone - 4
Tiger - 4
Turk - 4
Yank - 4
Admiral - 3
Bad Bill - 3
Beau - 3
Big Daddy - 3
Big Dan - 3
Blimp - 3
Bones - 3
Boomer - 3
Brick - 3
Bruno - 3
Bump - 3
Bus - 3
Butcher Boy - 3
Catfish - 3
Chub - 3
Cookie - 3
Country - 3
Crab - 3
Cyclone - 3
Dino - 3
Dodo - 3
Dolly - 3
Dude - 3
Footsie - 3
Gator - 3
General - 3
Gentleman George - 3
Goose - 3
Gunner - 3
Hickory - 3
Home Run - 3
Hoss - 3
Jeep - 3
Jigger - 3
Jo-Jo - 3
Jug - 3
Klondike - 3
Long John - 3
Long Tom - 3
Major - 3
Midget - 3
Minnie - 3
Mo - 3
Molly - 3
Moon - 3
Noisy - 3
Old Folks - 3
Old Reliable - 3
Packy - 3
Pee Wee - 3
Piano Legs - 3
Pick - 3
Piggy - 3
Popeye - 3
Prince Hal - 3
Pud - 3
Rowdy - 3
Scat - 3
Scooter - 3
Shadow - 3
Shag - 3
Sig - 3
Skipper - 3
Smiley - 3
Smokey Joe - 3
Squeaky - 3
Steamboat - 3
Stub - 3
Stud - 3
Stuffy - 3
Stump - 3
Suds - 3
The Bull - 3
Tip - 3
Toots - 3
Truck - 3
Tubby - 3
Turkey - 3
Watty - 3
Wimpy - 3
Windy - 3
Ziggy - 3
Zip - 3
Bad News - 2
Bananas - 2
Beauty - 2
Bee Bee - 2
Big Ben - 2
Big George - 2
Big Jack - 2
Big John - 2
Big Mac - 2
Big Mike - 2
Big Pete - 2
Big Sam - 2
Big Six - 2
Black Jack - 2
Blondie - 2
Bonnie - 2
Boob - 2
Brownie - 2
Bullet - 2
Bumpus - 2
Bunions - 2
Bunker - 2
Burrhead - 2
Cactus - 2
Campy - 2
Cannon Ball - 2
Cat - 2
Champ - 2
Chappy - 2
Chippy - 2
Cholly - 2
Chubby - 2
Cocky - 2
Coco - 2
Cocoa - 2
Commy - 2
Coonie - 2
Cozy - 2
Cracker - 2
Cuckoo - 2
Daffy - 2
Dazzy - 2
Death To Flying Things - 2
Diamond Jim - 2
Dinty - 2
Duck - 2
Dud - 2
Duff - 2
Duffy - 2
Eagle Eye - 2
El Caballo - 2
Fiddler - 2
Fire - 2
Firpo - 2
Foots - 2
Fuzzy - 2
Gimpy - 2
Gink - 2
Goody - 2
Grasshopper - 2
Grump - 2
Guido - 2
Hammerin' Hank - 2
Handy Andy - 2
Harry the Horse - 2
Heavy - 2
Hick - 2
Highpockets - 2
Hilly - 2
Hondo - 2
Honey - 2
Horse - 2
Hot Rod - 2
Howdy - 2
Hummer - 2
Humpty Dumpty - 2
Husky - 2
Icicle - 2
Iron Duke - 2
Jockey - 2
Lady - 2
Liberty - 2
Little Mac - 2
Long Bob - 2
Long Jim - 2
Mad Dog - 2
Monkey - 2
Mr. Chips - 2
Noodles - 2
Officer - 2
Oom Paul - 2
Peck - 2
Pickles - 2
Pony - 2
Pooch - 2
Possum - 2
Prime Time - 2
Prince - 2
Punch - 2
Rags - 2
Rasty - 2
Razor - 2
Reds - 2
Rosy - 2
Runt - 2
Sailor - 2
Scoop - 2
Scrappy - 2
Shanty - 2
Skeets - 2
Skippy - 2
Sleepy - 2
Sleepy Bill - 2
Slippery - 2
Smiling Al - 2
Smoky - 2
Snapper - 2
Snipe - 2
Snuffy - 2
Soldier Boy - 2
Sparrow - 2
Speedy - 2
Spoke - 2
Spook - 2
Spot - 2
Squirrel - 2
Stash - 2
Sterling - 2
Stoney - 2
Sugar Bear - 2
Swats - 2
Sweet Lou - 2
Swish - 2
Tarzan - 2
The Golden Greek - 2
The Kid - 2
The Mad Russian - 2
The Octopus - 2
The Silver Fox - 2
The Terminator - 2
Three Finger - 2
Tink - 2
Topsy - 2
Tot - 2
Tripp - 2
Tub - 2
Tuck - 2
Tuffy - 2
Tut - 2
Twig - 2
Wagon Tongue - 2
Whoa Bill - 2
Wildfire - 2
Woodie - 2
Yip - 2
Yo-Yo - 2
Zeb - 2
3-Dog - 1

Sports: The Problem With the Dead Ball Era

2010-03-05T23:47:00.002-07:00

On Tuesday, I outlined some of the challenges I'm facing while attempting to rank baseball's all-time offensive greats in order. Today, I'm adding another: The Dead Ball Era.

Originally, I didn't see it as an issue. As long as data was complete, ratios would have no bias. Whether you hit 30 home runs in an era when the average was 15 or four when the average was two, your ratio and dominance over the league was considered the same.

I was comfortable with this assessment. I kept an open mind when Barry Bonds' 2001 season was ranked surprisingly low in terms of home run dominance for a season. The home run was at its most common point, after all. We are attracted to big numbers, so it's easy to be conditioned to think that 73 in such an era is greater than 40 in another (even if they are equals).

I saw it as an opportunity when all of these names I was unfamiliar with started popping up on the list. Pretty cool, really. I knew, though, it would open me up to scrutiny. So it was important that I dug deep to verify that what I was doing made sense.

So I took a closer look at the most dominant home run seasons in order. I stumbled upon a very common theme: Dead Ball Era.

I have no problem with Dead Ball Era players appearing near the top. But when I took a closer look, I realized they were in the top 10, top 50, and top 100 at a disproportionate rate.

Understand that the only players in my analysis that played in this era are from 1885 through 1919. So even if we could expect an equal proportion from each era, we're looking at a max of 33% from that era. And understand, this would be a very favorable number. While the era makes up approximately one third of the years analyzed, it makes up far fewer of the number of players.

Three Dead Ball players among the 10 most dominant home run seasons ever. Ok. Possible. Nine of the first 20. Twenty-five of the first 50. Forty-eight of the first 100.

Now we're looking at a problem.

It makes sense why. When the average player is hitting one or two home runs -- or even three or four -- the ability to reach "dominance" with a few swings is much easier. And when that happens, not only do you get dominant ratios, but you increase the likelihood that several players from the same year will have high ratios. In other words, the bell curve is different during the Dead Ball Era. There is a higher concentration of players near the top.

Think of the example earlier. Let's say the average number of home runs during a given season is 1.33, like it was in 1918. Babe Ruth hit 11 that year (8.25 ratio). So did Tilly Walker. Gavvy Cravath hit eight (6.0). Frank Baker, George Burns, Walter Cruise and Cy Williams all hit six (4.5). Another group of six players hit five (3.75).

Now let's put that into perspective. During 2001, the average number of home runs hit was 15.7. Barry Bonds hit 73 (4.65 ratio). If players in 2001 (one of the biggest home run seasons ever) hit over the average number at the same rate as these players in 1918, we'd get...

Two players with 130 home runs
One player with 94
Four players with 71
Six players with 59

Ultimately, we need to determine if these players were simply more dominant in 1918, or if there is something about the data that is unreliable.

While I'm open to Barry Bonds' 73 home runs not being at the top, it seemed incredibly odd that he was 167th (coincidentally, behind 166 Roger Maris in 1961). And far too many of the players ahead of them had put up single digit totals (12 are below 10 and 73 below 20).

While there will be similar variations across different stats and eras, I see this as the extreme. There is no other stat I am evaluating for which an average could be so close to zero. When that's the case -- and one or two home runs swing the perception of a player tremendously -- such an analysis is volatile.

Do we eliminate the home run stat? An argument could be made that we put far too much value in the home run. Such oddities are not evident when evaluating total bases, and this stat is probably a better measure of a player's ability anyway.

[It should be noted that, unlike the home run stat, concentration of Dead Ball Era players are much more reasonably concentrated when viewing the top seasons ever for total bases. Seventeen are in the top 100 (vs. 48 for home runs), zero in the top 10, three in the top 20, nine in the top 50 and 29 in the top 150.]

Do we eliminate the era? The problem, of course, is that some great players are part of this era. Honus Wagner, Ty Cobb, Nap Lajoie, Tris Speaker and even Babe Ruth played at least a portion of their careers prior to 1920.

What is worse, eliminating these players from the discussion or keeping them in, thus providing some potentially questionable data? It may make sense to simply evaluate these years separately. But I worry that such an adjustment could be a slippery slope.

So on one hand, I can't imagine an analysis of baseball's all-time greats without including players from the Dead Ball Era. On the other, I can't imagine an analysis without home runs.

What do you think?

Sports: The Challenges of Rating the Best

2010-03-02T15:30:00.005-07:00

This blog has gone relatively quiet during the past week, but for a reason. I'm holding back a lot of info that I've been working on behind the scenes.

As you know, I'm in the process of attacking "The Project," a comprehensive statistical analysis of baseball's hitters, in search of a final ranking. It's a lot of work, and the wife is getting tired of my spreadsheet obsession, but we must trudge on.

And trudge, I will. I initially planned to rank the top 300 players. Then I decided to go to 500. Now... I may just go all the way, thanks to Sean Lahman's Baseball Database. I now have easy access to stats dating back to 1871. No more copying and pasting from BaseballReference.com.

Of course, even with this easy access, there are plenty of challenges.

1) Data only goes through 2006. Lahman's work was completed after the 2006 season, so the data stops there. I could add in the 2007-09 data manually, but I have a bad feeling that extra step may create a new one to two week mess. Since I'm focusing only on retired players, it's possible I could stick with the data I have. Maybe manually add in data for those players who may be in the top 300-1000 (or 100,000). Of course, I hate adding in incomplete data. In all likelihood, I'll add in every missing line of data or none at all.

2) Volume of data. The first time I started using this data, it crashed my computer several times. I've experienced several frustrating waiting games for data to calculate. I have to wait because I hadn't recently saved and feared losing the data. There are nearly 10,000 players I am evaluating with more than 50,000 lines of data by season. I've had to get creative to make the data manageable, but this has meant creating dozens of separate docs. Currently, I'm going category by category and comparing the stats of all players from all seasons. I created a template that I paste into that calculates. Paste and wait 90 minutes to complete. It's good fun.

3) Which stats are important? This isn't the first time I've pondered the question. I want to consider runs, hits, doubles, triples, home runs, RBI, stolen bases, total bases, walks, AVG, OBP, SLG and OPS. However, you can't just view them all equally. Home runs are also part of total bases, SLG and OPS. OPS already includes OBP and SLG. Hits are a big part of AVG and OBP. Lots of duplication and overlap. I'm hesitant to create some crazy formula that weights categories differently because there is no true way to weight them accurately. Instead, I will likely view them all individually to assist with my decisions.

4) Quality or quantity? I've actually considered eliminating the qualitative stats entirely (AVG, OBP, SLG, OPS) when evaluating individual seasons. Ultimately, does it really matter what your batting average was? I want results, and if you had the season's best batting average over 500 plate appearances, but someone else had the league's most hits in 600 plate appearances, I'd take the most hits. It's also very tricky differentiating averages when looking at an individual season. While I can eliminate anyone who didn't average 3.1 plate appearances per league game, there are still evaluational dilemmas. What is better, .350 in 500 plate appearances or .330 in 700? While I did create a formula for this way back in the day that considers comparison to league average and number of plate appearances, I haven't decided yet whether it's worth using in this case.

5) Seasons vs. career. I've decided that possibly the most important measure will be number of dominant seasons in one's career when compared to the league average. However, we can also look at career stats and compare how the player did over the course of their career (in totality) compared to the league average. In this case, there would still be value in the qualitative stats, although it is again something of a duplication of efforts (a player who was 10% above the league average over the course of his career in hits will be quite close to 10% above the league average in batting average, depending on number of walks against the league average).

6) Definition of dominance. While I have a nice list of the most dominant seasons in each statistical category, working with this data is not easy. If Player A had the most dominant season ever in home runs, that doesn't make him the most dominant player ever, even in that category. Maybe Player B had the next three most dominant seasons. So you could add all of the ratios the player had over the league average in a given category. However, if you do this the player who lasted 24 years will naturally have the advantage (24 slightly above average seasons will trump 15 dominant ones in most cases). This would not accomplish my goal. So I am going to look at most dominant season as well as most dominant two, three, four, five, down to 20 seasons. I may decide that dominance is ultimately defined by comparing the 10 best seasons of each player. Could be 15. Or maybe all will be taken into consideration. Still working it out. Either way, I think I'm a step closer than I once was.

An example of this that I uncovered in between 90 minute calculations was the most dominant base stealers. When compared to the league average, the most dominant season is owned by Maury Wills. He maintains the status of most dominant base stealer through seven seasons. However, Lou Brock surpasses Wills when you look at their eight most dominant seasons. And Rickey Henderson tops them both from seasons 18 and on. Of course, Henderson accumulated more seasons than either player. When compared to the number of seasons the three share (14), Brock is the most dominant. If you want to focus only on a core number of seasons (say, five), Wills is the most dominant. If you want to factor in accumulation and longevity, Henderson is the most dominant. What is the right answer? I think Brock, particularly since Henderson only passed him by once he started accumulating stats in seasons Brock didn't play. Henderson played a total of 25 seasons.

I'm sure we'll see something very similar when it comes to hits and Pete Rose. It's a dilemma.

7) Incomplete data. Only a core number of statistics have been around since 1871. Some, like strikeouts and stolen bases, have gaps of years when we don't have the data. And some years, particularly before 1885, we're missing data for some teams but not others. As a result, there was a skewed baseline for the average player, resulting in some inflated ratios. I eliminated statistics of all players before 1885 to solve this. While one could eliminate all seasons that don't have every core statistic that is available today, that would result in a very incomplete analysis. And I could, technically, eliminate the Dead Ball Era, but what fun would that be? That takes care of core seasons of players like Ty Cobb and even some Babe Ruth years. While we have fewer stats for these seasons, they are complete. Ratios will still work for these years since player performance is compared to the league average that is accurate.

8) Readjust preconceived idea of greatness. When we include the Dead Ball Era, it's important to take the ratios seriously. A player who hit 10, 15 or 20 home runs in some years is the equivalent of 50 now. That may seem crazy -- and even flawed -- but it's greatness in the perspective of era. I would never consider 30 home runs now "great." Meanwhile, hitting 15 during some seasons was considered an amazing accomplishment. It's not because they were inferior players back then. While diet and average strength were certainly part of it, the overwhelming factors were cavernous parks, dead baseballs, and a pitcher's advantage. Prior to 1920, the ball was wound less tightly, one would be used per game, and pitchers could freely spit on them and mark them up. By the end of the game, they were often misshapen and lopsided. Even Barry Bonds would have had trouble hitting home runs then.

I recently published the stats of Home Run Baker in my daily "Awesome Baseball Names" list on Twitter, and one response I received about him was that he should change his nickname because he finished with fewer than 100 career round-trippers. Though he never hit more than 12 in a season, he hit nearly three times that of the league average in his era. He is a Hall of Famer, and when taken in the context of his era, he earned his nickname.

Sports: The Consistently Average Hall of Famer

2010-02-25T21:36:00.000-07:00

As I've been burying myself in research to rank the top 300 offensive baseball players ever, something continues to bug me and I hadn't been able to figure out why until now.

We have this incredibly difficult time evaluating careers. We always have to ask the following two questions:

1) Was he one of the greats of his era?
2) Did he compile comparatively great career totals?

The second one is what bugs me. You can have two players who were the greatest of their respective eras. Put up identical stats for 12 years. One player retired and never played again. The other played, though horribly, for another eight years. We will say that the player with 20 years of service time is a Hall of Famer, while the one with 12 is not.

Yet, in the end, aren't those 12 years what actually make each player a Hall of Famer in the first place?

But it wasn't until I started comparing players to the league average that I realized just how insane this is. Player after player with dominant stats, but short careers. Not in the Hall of Famer. Player after player with unimpressive stats on an annual basis, but a long career. Hall of Famer.

Let's say you start your career at age 20 in 1985. You are a productive -- though statistically average -- and durable player. You are able to last 25 years. Guess what? You'd end up with the following totals:

.263 AVG
3,074 Hits
336 Home Runs
231 Stolen Bases

Now, this may be an extreme example. Very few players will last 25 years, particularly if they only produce the league average from start to finish. But do you see where this is going?

It really hit me when I looked at Pete Rose's numbers. He had a career batting average of .303 and a career record 4,256 hits. The league average over the course of his career was .254. Had Pete rose hit .254 instead of .303, he would have finished with 3,592 career hits -- or fourth behind Cobb, Aaron and Musial.

While I understand that he was able to compile that number of plate appearances because he hit a career .303, it still goes to show you how silly the necessity is for career benchmarks. You only need to be slightly better than the league average every season, be durable, play for 20 years, and you should compile Hall of Fame stats. Now this is easier said than done, obviously, but the fact that it's possible tells me we are focusing on the wrong stats.

The Hall of Fame is for all-time greats. It's not for "consistently average to above average and durable for a long time." If you were one of the most dominant players for a decade, it should not matter what else you did.

That's why I'm completely altering how I analyze players in my Top 300. Originally, I'd look both at career stats versus the league average as well as annual stats versus the league average. I now realize there is no need for this.

I am taking ratios of player performance over league average and comparing it to all players in the history of the game for a given category. If you have a season in the top 10, you are one of the all-time greats in a statistic (even if for a season). If you are in the top 20, a handful of times, you clearly had a few excellent seasons. If you repeatedly show up in the top 100 in this and other categories, you are a great baseball player.

Does it really matter if this person ended up with 3,000 hits or 600 home runs? Does it matter if he padded his stats with 10 years past his prime?

This doesn't mean that I will anoint players who were dominant for two seasons as Hall of Famers. It means that number of dominant years -- and in the most statistics -- will be my measuring stick, not career numbers. In many, but not all, cases the career stats will follow.

Through my analysis, I've stumbled upon several players who dropped off the face of the earth after about 10 great years. I have never even heard of some of them. They put up some amazing seasons, but they don't have great career totals.

Should that really mean they aren't Hall of Famers?

Sports: The Lineup Debate

2010-02-24T20:54:00.006-07:00

As a baseball fan, it's fun to play manager. We always think we're a little smarter, or we at least could improve upon a certain aspect of our favorite team's management. Bunting, stealing a base, use of the bullpen, use of platoons. We argue about it all. But one of the most basic management strategies is also the most hotly contested.

The Lineup Card.

Everyone has an opinion. The manager is almost always wrong.

The season hasn't even started, and we're already debating lineups. Milwaukee Brewers manager Ken Macha admitted to toying with the idea of batting the pitcher eighth this year, moving speedy rookie Alcides Escobar to the nine hole.

He's crazy! Why would you give the pitcher more at bats than a non-pitcher?! Managers never do this, and there's a reason for that!

Well, this actually isn't the first time a manager has considered such a strategy. St. Louis Cardinals manager Tony LaRussa often uses it (he abandoned it last season). LaRussa, though, wasn't the first.

And it's not the first time Brewer fans have dealt with this issue either. Former manager Ned Yost also employed it from time to time. I admit, I thought it was idiotic when Yost did it. But I generally doubted Yost's baseball acumen in general, so it just seemed to me like he was trying to look smart without having any supporting evidence to do it.

When Macha discussed it, I may have had a slightly different reaction. The first was, "Eh?" But I at least heard him out.

When Yost did it, he batted Jason Kendall ninth as his "second lead-off hitter." With Macha, it's Escobar. Immediately, the argument seems to be much stronger this time around.

Baseball has traditions, and the lineup is one of them. We've come to expect the following in a National League lineup:

1) Fastest player
2) Slap hitter who controls the bat well, bunts, probably doesn't hit for much power
3) Team's best hitter
4) Team's most dangerous power hitter
5) Next most dangerous power hitter, provides protection for clean-up hitter
6) Next best power hitter
7) Next best hitter
8) Team's worst non-pitching hitter
9) Pitcher

This is the way it is, and the way it's seemingly always been. There are defined roles in the lineup, and some rather poor players have made a career out of satisfying one of these roles.

Yet, the dirty little secret in baseball is that the lineup means less than any of us wants to admit. Studies by Cyril Morong of BeyondTheBoxscore, Ken Arneson of CatFishStew and Ryan Armbrust of ThePastime have all provided some support for questioning the generally accepted lineup strategies. It's largely over my head, in some cases, so I encourage you to read it for yourself so I don't do it a disservice by attempting to explain the work.

BaseballMusings gets credit for bringing it all together and creating a nifty little lineup tool. Based on On Base Percentage and Slugging Percentage, the tool generates the lineups that will result in the most and least possible runs scored.

Here is an example, based on the Milwaukee Brewers' 2010 projected roster.

As you can see, they speculate that the Brewers would score the most possible runs with Prince Fielder hitting lead-off and Ryan Braun hitting second. Additionally, Yovani Gallardo (or whatever pitcher would throw on that day) would hit eighth with Alcides Escobar hitting ninth. Not surprisingly, the line-up that would result in the least runs has the pitcher batting first.

Now, forget for a moment that it looks funny having big Prince Fielder bat lead-off. Throw out the traditions of baseball for a moment. Have an open mind.

It makes sense.

It makes sense because you want your best hitters to get as many at bats as possible throughout the game. That would give you, one would expect, the best possible chance to win.

It makes sense that Escobar would hit ninth instead of eighth since it would make it more likely that a runner would be on when Fielder and Braun come to the plate after the first inning.

But your biggest power hitters need to hit third and fourth because they need to come up with runners on base. You are giving up runs by having them hit at the top of the order!

This may be true, but in the first inning only. Over the course of the season, however, if you are giving your two best hitters more plate appearances, shouldn't that result in more home runs? More runs?

It's also interesting that Carlos Gomez, who some may see as a prototypical lead-off or number two hitter due to his blazing speed, is often listed second in the lineup as part of the "Worst Lineups" list. Gomez is often sixth or seventh in the "Best Lineups" list, which would be atypical. You'd never see a no-power hitter like Gomez hit sixth.

But in these cases, it appears the intent is to hide your worst hitters (Gomez and Hart) in the six and seven holes before the pitcher.

Whether you think this is a crazy lineup or not, possibly the most interesting part of this study is the difference between the highest (5.295 runs) and lowest (4.613) scoring lineups. In other words, the worst thing you could possibly do with your lineup is cost your team about .7 runs per game. And that's by hitting the pitcher lead-off.

Now, this is based entirely on statistics, and I'd argue that it misses some important factors. For example, speed is never a consideration. It's based entirely on OBP and SLG. However, if you have two players with similar OBP, wouldn't you rather have the one with better speed on base in front of a good hitter? He would have a better chance to score from first on a double or from second on a single.

That said, I still appreciate the study. It makes us question conventional wisdom. That's always a good thing. And it provides some statistical evidence that batting the pitcher eighth isn't all that crazy.

And more than anything, it makes me question these set roles we've come to expect. Particularly when you have players like Ryan Braun and Prince Fielder, who hit home runs and extra base hits at a high rate, speed in front of them is of little use. Base runners will not (or should not) regularly attempt stolen bases with Braun and Fielder up or coming to the plate.

In the end, what should a Brewer fan want more than anything else when Braun or Fielder are up? It really should be an easy answer. You want base runners. And whether that means batting them early in the lineup and a non-pitcher ninth or it means simply loading the top of the lineup with high OBP hitters, you accomplish that.

Instead, I've seen many asking for Escobar to lead off and Corey Hart to bat second. Why? Because Escobar is the fastest and Hart also has speed. Would this really accomplish more runs than putting two players at the top of the order who reach base most often?

Maybe Prince Fielder shouldn't hit lead-off. Maybe he should. But baseball, though it is great partly because of its history and traditions, also fails to progress because of them. It isn't blasphemous to question the way things have always been done. Innovation isn't a dirty word.

In all likelihood, we won't notice any difference no matter what lineup Macha writes up. But he's bound to be criticized the first time the pitcher, batting eighth, comes up to bat in a crucial situation with two outs. And it's unlikely he'll get any credit when, over the course of the season, the Brewers score a couple of runs more.

In the end, that's all it's going to be. Teams aren't going to hit the pitcher first, second, third, or anything other than eighth or ninth. So in the end, the difference in lineups for a single game is close to nothing, completely unnoticeable. So while we shouldn't expect Fielder to bat lead-off, it isn't going to make much of a difference where he hits.

But I guess if it were obvious who needed to bat where, we'd have nothing to argue about. And that, after all, is part of the fun of being a baseball fan.

Sports: Spreadsheet Madness

2010-02-22T20:52:00.001-07:00

My nights and weekends have been filled with pounding away at Excel. Magic is happening. Determined to provide some clarity to who the greatest 300 offensive baseball players were of all time, why, and in what order.

Why stop at 300? Good question. I'm collecting the data of close to 1,000, so there's really no reason to stop there. Could easily expand this to 500, but I may be getting ahead of myself. An awful lot of thought and analysis has to go into each selection.

Originally, I was going to divulge the number one offensive player first. Then I collected the data of 32 greats in an effort to find the best of the bunch. Suddenly, I realized that I couldn't stop with 32 to determine the best. I needed a much bigger sample size.

That doesn't mean that I don't have enough data to determine the greatest. I know who it is. However, I've been as meticulous as I've ever been through this process to make sure that every step is as accurate as possible. Just wrong to get sloppy with the crowning of the best ever.

For example, I could have set a baseline for the average player to compare all players to. Could have been rather similar from year to year. Could have been based on theory. Could have cut corners.

Didn't happen. The average player is variable from year to year. It is variable based on number of teams, number of teams with the DH, number of games played, and average statistics. Significant calculation goes into even that baseline determination.

And we could have used the same number of plate appearances each season for that average player, or we could have based it on the total number of games played that season. But I didn't. I realize that several factors go into the typical number of plate appearances. Different years will call for different strategies when it comes to pinch hitting, use of the farm system, impact of injuries, on and on. So I lined up the X (where X equals the total number of starting positions in a season) most plate appearances and averaged them.

Luckily, I even made that calculation for all 135 seasons. While somewhat consistent, there was variation. The minimum average plate appearances per game was 3.14 while the maximum was 4.19. That variation of more than one per game can result in more than 100 plate appearances for the season -- which can significantly throw off our comparison point.

I also realized that I don't want to make this study anti-climactic. If I reveal number one right away, suddenly you will lose interest. Hey, even I may lose interest. So I am going to start from the back and work my way to the front -- at least for the purpose of revealing the results.

But to be honest, I don't yet know the results. I am still loading career stats into my handy spreadsheet. That spreadsheet is becoming so large that it is turning into three and four working spreadsheets. I just pasted in Tito Francona. Yeah, I'm going deep.

I paste in Tito's stats, and the work is done for me. It's good stuff. But there's still a lot of pasting to do.

So I think I'd be doing this project a disservice by starting from the beginning, particularly before even completing the research. I am going to start from the bottom, and the results will hopefully reinforce my rankings for the top.

It may be a week or two until the first results begin trickling in, but they're coming. And I may be close to invisible on Twitter (and to my wife) in the meantime.

Until then... the 2010 baseball season is coming!

Sports: The Importance of the Average Player

2010-02-21T23:00:00.008-07:00

As you know, I've been working on a project to rank the 300 greatest offensive baseball players of all time. I am starting with number one.

I've been putting Baseball-Reference and Excel to work during the past week. Past several weeks, really. I am luckily a little more than dangerous with spreadsheets, so I can make some very quick magic of data and a plan.

Here is what I'm doing to make my final rankings:

1) Collect the stats of the 1,000 retired players who accumulated the most hits during their careers (this is a safe number from which I can expect to find my top 300 players);
2) Compare the raw career data of all players, between eras;
3) Compare ratios of career stats over average player had the hypothetical player had the same number of plate appearances;
4) Compare ratios of individual season by taking the star player's stats over the hypothetical average player (based on the average player's number of plate appearances, not the star player's).

As we know, the raw data in #2 has minimal value. It has some. It's interesting to know. But it is data that has no perspective. It's simply dangerous to compare the home runs hit by Honus Wagner, for example, to those hit by Cal Ripken.

So it is important to compare player stats to a baseline, which I like to call the average player. It is a theoretical player that doesn't exist. But the data is variable from year to year to reflect the environment of the star player's production.

In the end, the average player is critical to the success of this project. It is important to me to find the truth in data in order to make assumptions about players. The only way you can find truth is by taking statistics in perspective.

Therefore, how much greater were Babe Ruth's 60 home runs than that of the average player in 1927? And how does such a performance stack up in the history of baseball?

Also, if you were to take the ratios of Ruth's home runs to the league average for each season of his career, how many of his seasons would be among the all-time greats (he actually has the four highest ratios ever)?

Focusing on the right statistics is an important chore. Avoid duplication that may favor a particular type of player. Don't focus on numbers of little significance, like sacrifice flies. And, whenever possible, focus on stats that apply to all eras (only a handful of stats were kept dating back to 1876).

Let me show you a quick example of some of the work I've been doing. Following are the career stats of Pete Rose when compared to the the average player over the same number of plate appearances, along with the resultant ratios:

Player	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BB	TB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Pete Rose	2,165	4,256	160	1,314	198	1,566	5,752	.303	.375	.409	.784
Avg Player	1,709	3,592	318	1,594	248	1,333	5,316	.254	.319	.376	.695
Ratio	1.27	1.18	0.50	0.82	0.80	1.17	1.08	1.19	1.17	1.09	1.13

So in this case, both Pete Rose and the average player had 15,861 plate appearances to accumulate their stats. The average player's rate of success was different from year to year. Note that I find other stats as well, but I am limited for space here.

As you can tell from the numbers above, Pete Rose performed above the league average in runs, hits, walks, total bases, batting average, on-base percentage, slugging percentage and OPS; he was below average in home runs, runs batted in and (surprisingly) stolen bases.

So, Rose has certain ratios for each career offensive statistic. You will remember that I am comparing him to 31 other greats to find the greatest player of all time (to begin this project). You may be interested in knowing Rose's ranks when compared to those other 31 players in these statistics:

R (23)
H (14)
HR (31)
RBI (30)
SB (25)
BB (23)
BA (20)
OBP (26)
SLG (32)
OPS (31)
TB (31)

Think it's strange that the game's all-time hits king is 14th when compared to the other 31 players in ratio over the average player? Not when you break it down. Rose accumulated that many hits, not because he was the greatest hitter of all time, but because he was a very good hitter who played a long, long time. Finishing with a batting average 19% above the league average is good, but even the average hitter will accumulate nearly 3,600 hits with close to 16,000 plate appearances (see the table above).

Of course, Rose's long career hinders him in a sense. He played well beyond his prime, so his skills diminished and ratios dropped as a result. But there is yet another way we can look at his career.

Let's go year by year and compare how Rose did versus the league average.

Year	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BB	TB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
1963	1.8	1.4	0.5	0.8	2.4	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
1964	1.1	1.2	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9
1965	2.1	1.8	0.9	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
1966	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.3	0.6	0.9	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2
1967	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
1968	2.0	1.9	1.2	1.1	0.5	1.4	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3
1969	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4
1970	2.0	1.7	1.2	0.9	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
1971	1.6	1.7	1.3	0.9	2.1	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
1972	2.2	1.8	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
1973	2.0	1.9	0.5	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
1974	1.9	1.5	0.3	1.0	0.2	2.3	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1
1975	1.9	1.7	0.7	1.4	0.0	1.9	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
1976	2.4	1.8	1.3	1.2	0.8	1.9	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3
1977	1.5	1.6	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
1978	1.8	1.6	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
1979	1.4	1.6	0.3	1.0	2.0	2.1	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.2
1980	1.6	1.5	0.1	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.0
1981	1.9	1.7	0.0	0.9	0.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1
1982	1.3	1.4	0.3	0.9	0.8	1.5	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.0
1983	0.9	1.0	0.0	0.8	0.6	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.8
1984	0.7	0.9	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.0
1985	1.0	0.9	0.2	0.8	0.8	1.9	0.7	1.0	1.2	0.8	1.0
1986	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.8

[Note the prior discussion of not duplicating statistics. While we list all statistics together here, they are taken in context. For example, averages (AVG, OBP, SLG, OPS) are observed together, with the understanding that OPS makes up OBP and SLG. Additionally, it is understood that HR, in particular, weights TB.]

This way, Rose is not penalized by having some bad years. We can say, for example, that he had 10 or 15 of the greatest seasons ever by isolating them in this way.

So, how does Rose's ratios from his 24 years compare to those of the other 31 greats? Not so great. He didn't have a single ratio (when compared to the other greats in that category) that was considered the best or one of the top five best. He had three in the top 20 and five ratios in the top 50. That's not many when you consider we're comparing more than a dozen statistics for all 24 of his seasons (more than 250 chances).

By comparison, Babe Ruth has 78 ratios in the one of the categorical top 50s. While Ruth may be an unfair comparison for anyone, his career was much shorter as well.

We're able to see the truth about Rose's career with some very nifty use of data. The average player makes it all come to life.

Sports: The Average Baseball Player by Year

2010-02-21T21:57:00.003-07:00

Below is a table marking the stats of the "average player" for each Major League Baseball season since 1876. The statistics were determined as follows:

1) Use league AVG, OBP, SLG and OBP;
2) Find average rate of other cumulative stats by dividing total stat by total plate appearances;
3) Find the average player's plate appearances (details below);
4) Find average player's stats by applying rate as determined in #2 to plate appearances in #3.

The average player's plate appearances are found by:

1) Multiply number of offensive players in a starting lineup by number of teams to get total starting offensive positions (for example, (8 X 16) + (9 X 14) for 2009 (this is the total number of starting offensive positions that season -- we'll call it S);
2) Since S refers to the total number of starting offensive positions, we'll want to find the average plate appearances for the top S players.

Back to the example in 2009, there were a total of 254 starting positions. We would then list the top 254 players in plate appearances for that season and find the average of that number.

Once we apply the league average rate for cumulative stats to this number, we will get a much more realistic number for what to expect from the average player during that season.

Year	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
2009	538.4	64.5	125.3	14.5	61.5	8.5	96.7	.262	.333	.418	.751
2008	532.0	64.0	124.7	13.8	61.1	7.9	93.3	.264	.333	.416	.749
2007	544.3	67.3	129.8	14.3	64.2	8.4	92.9	.268	.336	.423	.758
2006	548.1	68.8	131.4	15.7	65.6	8.1	92.3	.269	.337	.432	.768
2005	537.0	64.4	126.8	14.5	61.3	7.4	88.3	.264	.330	.419	.749
2004	543.6	67.4	128.4	15.7	64.2	7.5	91.8	.266	.335	.428	.763
2003	539.5	66.1	126.8	15.0	63.0	7.4	88.7	.264	.333	.422	.755
2002	538.3	64.6	124.8	14.6	61.5	7.9	90.6	.261	.331	.417	.748
2001	538.7	66.8	126.4	15.7	63.6	8.9	93.4	.264	.332	.427	.759
2000	543.9	71.4	129.4	16.3	67.9	8.4	89.7	.270	.345	.437	.782
1999	538.9	70.2	128.8	15.7	66.7	9.7	88.4	.271	.345	.434	.778
1998	538.5	66.6	127.3	14.5	63.2	9.4	91.2	.266	.335	.420	.755
1997	534.2	65.8	126.2	14.1	62.3	10.1	91.1	.267	.337	.419	.756
1996	539.2	69.5	128.8	15.1	65.6	9.9	89.2	.270	.340	.427	.767
1995	474.9	59.3	112.1	12.4	55.9	8.9	77.1	.267	.338	.417	.755
1994	391.7	49.6	93.6	10.4	46.8	7.1	62.2	.270	.339	.424	.763
1993	532.1	63.6	125.3	12.3	59.7	9.9	80.2	.265	.332	.403	.736
1992	518.0	56.0	117.9	9.8	52.5	10.5	76.0	.256	.322	.377	.700
1991	517.5	58.4	117.7	10.9	54.9	10.0	78.5	.256	.323	.385	.708
1990	522.1	58.4	119.9	10.8	54.7	10.7	77.7	.258	.325	.385	.710
1989	519.0	56.4	117.7	10.0	52.6	10.1	76.7	.254	.320	.375	.695
1988	523.5	57.1	119.1	10.4	53.3	10.8	76.7	.254	.318	.378	.696
1987	530.5	65.2	124.2	14.6	61.3	11.7	82.3	.263	.331	.415	.747
1986	522.9	60.3	119.9	12.4	56.6	10.8	80.3	.258	.326	.395	.721
1985	531.9	60.4	122.0	12.0	56.8	10.3	74.5	.257	.323	.391	.714
1984	523.6	58.4	121.9	10.6	54.7	9.9	73.4	.260	.323	.385	.708
1983	527.2	59.6	122.9	10.8	56.0	10.9	71.3	.261	.325	.389	.714
1982	539.3	60.6	126.1	11.3	57.0	10.6	71.0	.261	.324	.389	.713
1981	355.7	37.5	81.2	6.0	35.1	6.8	44.5	.256	.320	.369	.689
1980	522.6	58.5	123.7	10.0	54.9	10.7	65.5	.265	.326	.388	.714
1979	534.7	62.4	126.4	11.4	58.6	9.9	66.8	.265	.330	.397	.727
1978	534.5	57.9	122.6	9.9	54.1	10.1	67.4	.258	.323	.379	.702
1977	542.9	63.2	127.8	12.2	59.1	10.1	73.0	.264	.329	.401	.730
1976	525.7	55.2	119.7	8.0	51.2	10.9	66.8	.255	.320	.361	.681
1975	529.3	58.0	120.6	9.6	54.0	9.0	68.7	.258	.327	.374	.701
1974	536.7	57.9	122.5	9.6	53.6	9.0	70.3	.257	.324	.369	.693
1973	530.5	58.4	121.3	11.1	54.4	7.3	72.6	.257	.325	.379	.704
1972	502.2	49.2	109.2	9.1	45.8	6.5	74.4	.244	.311	.354	.664
1971	519.7	53.4	115.3	10.1	49.9	6.3	74.2	.249	.317	.365	.682
1970	538.5	60.9	121.0	12.4	56.8	6.9	80.7	.254	.326	.385	.711
1969	558.3	59.7	122.8	11.8	55.2	7.0	84.7	.248	.320	.369	.689
1968	521.3	47.9	110.9	8.6	44.5	6.5	82.6	.237	.299	.340	.639
1967	526.5	52.8	114.4	9.9	48.7	5.9	83.9	.242	.306	.357	.664
1966	535.3	56.7	119.7	12.1	52.8	6.4	82.7	.249	.310	.376	.686
1965	538.7	56.8	118.3	11.8	52.7	6.4	84.6	.246	.311	.372	.683
1964	536.1	57.2	120.6	12.0	53.3	5.1	83.7	.250	.313	.378	.690
1963	536.8	56.1	118.7	11.9	52.2	5.4	82.4	.246	.309	.372	.681
1962	552.3	64.1	126.5	13.3	60.1	6.0	77.9	.258	.326	.393	.719
1961	526.8	62.2	120.5	13.1	58.0	5.0	71.9	.258	.328	.399	.727
1960	514.3	57.9	116.3	11.5	54.1	5.0	69.5	.255	.324	.388	.712
1959	510.6	58.5	116.6	12.1	54.9	4.6	67.9	.257	.324	.392	.716
1958	505.9	56.8	116.2	12.0	53.5	4.0	65.7	.258	.325	.394	.719
1957	516.2	57.6	118.3	11.9	54.2	4.2	64.7	.258	.324	.391	.715
1956	530.7	61.5	120.7	12.8	57.6	4.0	64.1	.258	.331	.397	.729
1955	517.7	60.3	117.7	12.1	56.6	3.8	58.9	.259	.332	.394	.726
1954	534.9	60.6	122.7	10.8	56.9	3.9	57.2	.261	.333	.390	.723
1953	539.9	64.7	127.1	11.7	60.6	3.8	57.8	.264	.336	.397	.733
1952	518.7	56.6	116.4	9.3	52.9	4.2	56.8	.253	.327	.370	.696
1951	523.2	61.4	120.9	10.2	57.4	4.7	50.9	.261	.336	.386	.722
1950	536.9	66.9	125.6	11.5	62.7	3.6	53.2	.266	.346	.402	.748
1949	514.8	61.1	118.6	9.1	57.0	3.9	47.9	.263	.344	.384	.728
1948	522.8	61.8	121.4	8.5	57.8	4.4	49.2	.263	.341	.382	.723
1947	531.9	60.4	122.7	8.7	56.4	4.2	51.1	.261	.336	.377	.713
1946	487.8	51.1	110.6	6.2	47.2	4.5	49.7	.256	.328	.360	.688
1945	512.7	55.6	118.9	5.4	51.4	5.3	43.5	.260	.329	.355	.684
1944	528.5	57.2	123.3	5.7	52.9	5.1	45.2	.260	.326	.358	.684
1943	528.0	53.8	119.2	5.0	49.7	5.6	47.5	.253	.323	.344	.667
1942	526.6	56.0	118.7	6.0	51.5	5.4	46.7	.253	.323	.350	.674
1941	544.5	63.0	127.1	7.5	58.3	5.0	49.8	.262	.334	.375	.709
1940	545.6	65.8	130.9	8.9	60.9	5.4	51.5	.267	.334	.392	.726
1939	514.8	63.7	125.4	7.8	59.3	5.1	45.6	.275	.344	.397	.740
1938	547.2	68.7	133.7	8.5	64.5	5.1	47.8	.274	.343	.396	.739
1937	543.4	68.2	134.3	8.1	63.3	5.8	50.9	.277	.343	.399	.742
1936	563.4	73.9	143.1	7.9	68.7	5.5	47.4	.284	.349	.404	.753
1935	549.0	68.6	137.4	7.6	63.7	5.0	45.7	.279	.341	.397	.738
1934	534.5	67.1	134.0	7.5	62.7	5.1	47.2	.279	.342	.397	.738
1933	547.6	63.6	132.9	6.2	59.1	5.0	43.1	.270	.330	.376	.706
1932	544.5	68.3	135.9	7.7	63.6	5.6	44.4	.277	.337	.400	.737
1931	530.0	65.6	132.6	5.9	60.9	6.0	43.5	.278	.339	.391	.730
1930	538.3	75.8	141.7	8.7	70.6	6.0	43.9	.296	.356	.434	.790
1929	549.3	72.7	140.5	7.7	67.3	7.6	39.8	.289	.353	.417	.770
1928	528.3	64.4	131.2	6.0	59.4	7.0	39.2	.281	.344	.397	.741
1927	529.7	65.1	132.8	5.1	59.6	8.0	38.2	.284	.345	.393	.738
1926	529.1	63.6	130.7	4.8	58.1	7.1	37.7	.281	.345	.389	.733
1925	518.6	67.9	134.3	6.3	61.6	7.5	35.9	.292	.354	.411	.765
1924	527.2	64.8	134.3	5.0	58.7	8.3	36.7	.287	.348	.394	.742
1923	542.8	67.0	136.7	5.5	60.2	8.8	39.6	.284	.347	.391	.738
1922	552.9	69.3	141.5	6.1	62.0	8.3	40.0	.288	.348	.401	.749
1921	552.8	69.0	143.4	5.4	62.0	8.6	40.3	.291	.348	.403	.750
1920	544.4	61.9	133.9	3.6	53.8	9.9	41.7	.276	.335	.372	.707
1919	483.8	50.0	113.2	2.6	42.8	12.0	39.5	.263	.322	.348	.670
1918	431.1	41.9	97.0	1.3	35.2	11.3	33.6	.254	.317	.325	.642
1917	525.6	50.8	115.7	1.9	42.9	13.7	49.3	.249	.311	.324	.635
1916	517.8	49.8	113.6	2.1	42.1	15.4	53.4	.248	.312	.326	.638
1915	524.1	53.9	115.4	2.4	45.4	15.6	53.1	.250	.318	.332	.650
1914	524.0	54.8	117.4	2.7	46.1	17.3	55.7	.254	.321	.337	.659
1913	512.9	55.7	117.5	2.6	46.7	18.2	51.9	.259	.325	.345	.670
1912	513.7	61.5	121.5	2.4	51.5	18.7	25.5	.269	.337	.359	.695
1911	527.8	62.8	123.3	2.9	52.4	19.1	27.0	.266	.336	.357	.693
1910	525.1	54.2	115.1	2.0	44.5	18.5	25.0	.249	.318	.326	.644
1909	504.0	48.7	108.9	1.4	39.5	16.9	0.0	.244	.306	.311	.618
1908	519.9	48.3	110.7	1.5	39.2	15.7	0.0	.239	.297	.305	.602
1907	521.0	50.5	114.4	1.4	41.1	16.1	0.0	.245	.305	.309	.614
1906	514.9	51.0	113.4	1.5	41.7	17.2	0.0	.247	.306	.314	.621
1905	531.3	56.0	118.1	2.0	46.2	17.1	0.0	.248	.307	.323	.630
1904	534.2	54.6	119.4	1.9	44.5	16.3	0.0	.247	.301	.321	.622
1903	500.6	59.2	118.5	2.0	48.8	16.4	0.0	.262	.317	.346	.664
1902	497.1	58.4	120.0	2.1	48.7	15.8	0.0	.267	.322	.344	.665
1901	507.2	66.0	124.9	2.7	54.5	17.0	0.0	.272	.327	.360	.686
1900	504.3	68.8	126.7	2.9	57.1	19.6	0.0	.279	.339	.366	.705
1899	527.2	72.8	133.6	2.6	60.2	20.1	0.0	.282	.343	.366	.710
1898	549.9	71.8	133.3	2.4	60.0	16.3	0.0	.271	.334	.347	.681
1897	490.3	73.9	128.1	2.9	62.1	20.9	0.0	.292	.354	.386	.741
1896	485.6	74.6	125.9	3.2	62.7	23.9	27.5	.290	.354	.387	.741
1895	503.5	83.3	133.2	3.8	69.8	23.0	28.6	.296	.361	.400	.761
1894	517.3	95.0	143.8	5.1	80.5	25.3	26.9	.309	.379	.435	.814
1893	509.1	82.5	127.2	3.7	68.4	22.0	26.7	.280	.356	.379	.736
1892	552.6	73.5	122.3	3.3	57.6	25.0	46.7	.245	.317	.327	.644
1891	501.6	73.2	114.1	3.4	57.7	24.1	44.3	.254	.332	.343	.675
1890	487.3	74.7	113.7	2.9	56.8	26.5	25.4	.260	.337	.351	.688
1889	514.6	79.0	122.4	4.1	62.3	29.3	46.7	.263	.333	.357	.690
1888	472.8	62.0	105.1	3.0	46.9	30.7	23.3	.239	.291	.320	.611
1887	486.7	80.1	120.8	3.6	62.0	37.9	16.8	.271	.332	.374	.705
1886	470.3	68.7	107.3	2.5	49.2	19.4	25.4	.246	.303	.332	.634
1885	400.7	55.9	92.1	1.9	39.0	0.0	20.1	.244	.288	.325	.613
1884	355.1	51.8	82.3	2.1	15.2	0.0	13.4	.243	.279	.327	.606
1883	384.4	57.9	95.0	1.5	29.0	0.0	18.4	.257	.286	.345	.631
1882	314.0	44.3	75.1	1.3	24.2	0.0	15.7	.248	.276	.330	.606
1881	322.1	43.4	80.3	1.0	31.5	0.0	22.6	.260	.290	.338	.628
1880	320.3	40.8	76.1	0.8	28.4	0.0	25.5	.245	.267	.320	.587
1879	316.4	43.7	79.2	0.7	30.2	0.0	23.6	.255	.271	.329	.599
1878	250.2	34.0	63.2	0.4	23.8	0.0	19.3	.259	.279	.319	.598
1877	249.6	36.3	66.0	0.4	25.1	0.0	12.9	.271	.289	.338	.627
1876	272.5	40.8	71.1	0.5	26.4	0.0	7.8	.265	.277	.321	.598

Sports: The Project

2010-02-18T22:09:00.004-07:00

The quest begins to find the greatest 300 baseball players of all time. Step one: Find the very best.

I've worked on several projects covered by these very blog pages. I'm on a mission to embark on a much bigger one.

"The Project" is multi-layered. Many steps. May take months, if not longer.

The ultimate goal? Rank the top 300 offensive baseball players of all time.

The reason for this is pretty simple: I want a clearer view of the game's greatest. Cutting across eras, I want to answer some of the game's brain-numbing questions. Not necessarily to solve any global historical dilemma. Just for me. I expect to learn quite a bit from this exercise.

I want to be able to tell you who the greatest player of all time was and why. I want to be able to explain, with facts, why Willie Mays was better than Mickey Mantle (or vice versa).

I've gone through several scenarios in my head to determine how I would accomplish this. I keep coming back to one, simplified start:

Who is number one?

So we'll start with the very best baseball player of all time and go from there. Since I will need to consider several players to make the first declaration, my initial pool will help me make future declarations as well.

Who is number one? Well, I have my ideas. Probably rather obvious, but maybe not. Before I can make such a decision, I'd need to first narrow the field.

It's always important to make a such an analysis without bias, so I'm narrowing the field entirely based on strict statistical requirements.

In order to qualify, a player must be retired and in the top 10 all time in career hits, home runs, or one of my recently developed peer-based qualitative categories: AVG, OBP, SLG, or OBP when taken as a ratio over the average player of their era. Note that I am only using Major League stats, so those who played part, most or all of their careers in the Negro League, for example, will have incomplete stats for this comparison. Only starring in The Natural will also not be enough to qualify.

When I was done, I ended up with 32 players. Some will obviously not be the best ever player, but I want to make sure I don't miss anyone. And this also helps me set a field for the top five later on.

Here are the "prime" 32 (in alphabetical order by first name, thanks to Excel):

Babe Ruth
Barry Bonds
Billy Hamilton
Cap Anson
Carl Yastrzemski
Dan Brouthers
Eddie Collins
Frank Robinson
Hank Aaron
Hank Greenberg
Harmon Killebrew
Honus Wagner
Jimmie Foxx
Joe DiMaggio
Lou Gehrig
Mark McGwire
Mickey Mantle
Nap Lajoie
Paul Molitor
Pete Rose
Rafael Palmeiro
Reggie Jackson
Rod Carew
Rogers Hornsby
Sammy Sosa
Stan Musial
Ted Williams
Tony Gwynn
Tris Speaker
Ty Cobb
Willie Keeler
Willie Mays

And Babe Ruth is listed first! Funny that Willie Mays is last, too. Nice bookends, who will likely be on the short list of final names to consider. Purely coincidence, I promise.

Let me be clear about how these players will be analyzed. I will not give consideration to whether they are or are not eligible for the Hall of Fame. I will try very hard not to let use of performance enhancing drugs lead my decisions. And defensive position played means absolutely nothing in this analysis.

For the most part, everyone is on an equal playing field. That said, era will be considered -- which is what will make the era-based qualitative stats valuable. But totals will be part of the equation. I will also consider awards won, All-Star appearances, times led the league in categories, and overall dominance of one's era. A long, dominant career will be helpful, though not required.

What do you think? Is there an obvious number one player? Are there certain players we can immediately remove from this discussion?

Technology: Keeping the Dirt out of Twitter

2010-02-17T13:02:00.001-07:00

It's been about six months now, and my use of Twitter continues to develop. One thing I decided very early on was to keep my use "clean." In other words, don't lie, deceive, scam, spam or pad numbers.

In the beginning, it wasn't clear what was and wasn't Kosher. I wasn't sure how to use the service, so I read countless guides and "guru" advice articles. Of course, that wasn't necessarily a good idea.

But over time, I've decided not to do any of the following:

Auto-follow those who follow me
Auto-Direct Message those who follow me
Send any DM spam, automated or not
Follow hundreds of people at a time to get numbers, then unfollow those who didn't follow me back
Use automated replies that respond to keywords with a script response

I'm sure there are other tactics I'm missing. Basically, if it doesn't feel right -- if it feels spammy or sleazy -- I'm not doing it.

Some of these are obvious, some are used by respected people. It's not about the "right" or "wrong" way to use Twitter. Maybe you do one or more of these things. Maybe there is an ethical way to use them effectively. To me, I'm just not comfortable doing them.

With that said, there are some gray areas that I'm grappling with. The current ethical dilemma I'm dealing with is the use of lists.

My perception of lists has evolved over time. In the beginning, I saw lists as a potential game changer that could alter the way that we looked at Twitter stats. Even after tempering my enthusiasm a few days later, I viewed lists as a major ego factor that could affect how we viewed profiles.

However, I made an observation in my first post about this subject that still sticks with me:

Now, technically, you can follow 1,000,000 people but focus only on the people you want to hear from.

I guess this is good and bad. It's good as a nice organizational tool. It's bad since you can now follow a large group of people with no intention of reading their stuff. You can bet that someone -- Twitter or a third party -- will provide the ability to make a list your default view.

In other words, you could follow 50,000 people but only pay attention to 100 of them. Once again, lessens the value of "number of followers" since following inflates your numbers.

Bingo. It's exactly what bothers me about lists to this day.

Look at it this way: When someone follows you, you hope that they are actually reading your updates. You value them as an audience. However, if you discovered that they never read a single one of your posts and only follow you because you are following them, would your view of that relationship change?

It's obvious to me why people would do this. Personally, I rarely unfollow someone who follows me. It will happen occasionally, but it's rare. So if you follow everyone who follows you, you are bound to do a great job of retaining followers. When that happens, your numbers can spike quickly.

For me, growth has been very gradual. But make no mistake, my number of followers increases most quickly when I follow people.

I made a bunch of lists in the beginning. I still think it's cool when people add me to their lists. But I don't use my lists. To me, it's just a way to show appreciation. It's had no other value, no other useful application for my daily use.

Making a Big Deal about Nothing?
It's possible I'm missing a key angle. It's possible I'm overreacting to how lists are used.

For example, maybe you follow 10,000 people and focus on 100. That said, you still respond to the other 9,900 if they reply you. Is that an acceptable use of lists? Granted, you still never read anything they publish in their feed that doesn't mention you.

Or maybe you focus 90% of your time on a list and the other 10% you will read through some of the "other" posts. Would this be acceptable? Or would it need to be 50/50? Where is the line drawn (if there is one)?

There's only a dilemma because of potential reward. We all know what happens if you decide to follow a ton of people. If you make the proactive follow, you'll get followed back by a decent percentage of people. Those people are likely to remain loyal because it is a reciprocal relationship (at least on the surface). Likewise, those followers you follow back are likely to remain loyal for the same reasons.

If there were no reward for this activity, I would think nothing of it. But I fear that there is something unnatural about the resultant growth. That said, if I choose to only follow a designated 150 or so people, I've predetermined my future audience (since I am not famous, of course).

And ultimately, we all want to increase our audience. So what do you think? Is focusing on a list that isolates 10% (or maybe less) of the people you follow ethical? Where is the line drawn?

Technology: Google Buzz an Invitation to Switch to GMail

2010-02-16T15:53:00.005-07:00

I have used two web-based e-mail providers since they invented web-based e-mail providers. The first was Hotmail. The second was Yahoo!. I have used the same Yahoo! e-mail address for the past 10 years or so.

I don't want to switch. I really don't.

It's not that I love Yahoo!. It's fine. It does the job. But switching is such a pain. You have to e-mail everyone in your contacts and let them know your e-mail address changed. But you know that not everyone will make the change, so you have to continue to check your old account.

So, if you continue to check your old account, why make the change at all? And Yahoo! doesn't provide a free forwarding service (it's part of their Mail Plus package), so I would need to pay to forward my e-mail for a year. Smart of Yahoo! to do this, by the way.

Eh.

And then Google Buzz came out. I have to try it. I'm partially intrigued, but I also need to understand it to see if there is any way I can leverage it personally or professionally.

Of course, to use Buzz, you need a GMail account. And to really appreciate it, you need contacts (browsing publicly seems to be a bit cumbersome, at least for new users like me).

So, I imported all of my Yahoo! contacts to GMail. Problem is that Buzz only automatically connects you to the contacts you e-mail or chat with most. Well, I don't use GMail. So that's no one. So unless I actually start using GMail, I need to go through and type everyone's e-mail address in manually. All the while, I have no idea if they're even using the service.

So I want to use Buzz, but I don't want to change my e-mail address. And I don't want to start using a third e-mail address (in addition to my Yahoo! and professional addresses).

I can't decide whether this is a limitation of Buzz or all part of their master plan. What is the comparison? You don't need to change your e-mail address to use Twitter or Facebook (at least yet).

Facebook may be heading in this direction, however. I'm also holding back because of the rumored Titan, an e-mail service built into Facebook. Why switch now until the Facebook option comes out to compare?

Oh, and Yahoo! is also looking to revamp their e-mail offerings. Of course, that rumor first started in December of 2008. Regardless, this is a big decision, and there may be new options soon.

There are many reasons GMail built Buzz into GMail. They have 36 Million users who could become immediate Buzz users. Seamless integration. But it also forces people like me to strongly consider moving from their long-held e-mail addresses.

So do I switch to GMail to get the full sense of the value of Buzz? Do I hold out in anticipation of Titan or a revamped Yahoo! service? These are tough decisions.

But the fact that I'm even considering leaving Yahoo! for GMail makes the launch of Buzz a success. The question is whether they can convince me that Buzz will have enough relevance months down the line to make the leap.

What do you think? Are you confronted with a similar decision? If so, how are you handling it?

Sports: Name the Baseball Hall of Famers (1800s)

2010-02-12T18:30:00.000-07:00

My eight year-old son has been working on the Hall of Fame project that I gave to him for about a month now. He has gotten through all players who started their careers in the 1800s. You'll recall that I grouped players by era and mixed in players who were not inducted along with the ones who were. The task? With names removed, determine which players deserved induction and which did not based on statistics alone.

He needed a little progress report, so we checked his answers so far. To make it fair, I also made my evaluations of which players are deserving to see if I could do any better.

While there are 28 players who began their careers in the 1800s who were inducted, I only felt comfortable enshrining 23. Of course, I was not right on those 23.

The results? Of the 46 players listed, I was able to get 33 correct (71.7%). However, only 19 of the 23 players I thought were deserving actually made it into the Hall of Fame. That means there were nine other players I did not believe were deserving who are in the Hall.

My eight year-old son? He got 32 correct (69.6%). How many can you get right? Are you able to better analyze these players than a third grader?

Other tests for eras beyond the 1800s will follow soon.

Answers, with names, are at the bottom of this page. Don't cheat!

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player1	27	1871	1897	11,319	1,996	3,418	97	2,076	276	.333	.393	.445	.838
Comparison										.265	.314	.349	.663
Ratio										1.26	1.25	1.27	1.26

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player2	20	1871	1890	6,972	1,140	2,066	23	977	57	.312	.346	.392	.738
Comparison										.257	.294	.334	.628
Ratio										1.22	1.18	1.17	1.18

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player3	23	1872	1904	9,051	1,729	2,643	62	1,203	224	.311	.352	.423	.775
Comparison										.257	.302	.337	.640
Ratio										1.21	1.16	1.25	1.21

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player4	20	1872	1891	7,470	1,217	2,134	57	855	163	.302	.340	.409	.750
Comparison										.256	.297	.335	.632
Ratio										1.18	1.14	1.22	1.19

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player5	16	1878	1893	6,455	1,357	1,813	69	950	368	.308	.368	.438	.806
Comparison										.255	.308	.340	.648
Ratio										1.21	1.20	1.29	1.24

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player6	17	1878	1894	8,084	1,408	2,104	26	867	540	.275	.314	.341	.655
Comparison										.258	.313	.347	.660
Ratio										1.06	1.00	0.98	0.99

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player7	19	1879	1904	7,658	1,523	2,296	106	1,296	256	.342	.423	.519	.942
Comparison										.263	.320	.354	.673
Ratio										1.30	1.32	1.47	1.40

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player8	17	1879	1895	7,535	1,163	2,040	27	825	372	.290	.337	.374	.712
Comparison										.261	.317	.351	.669
Ratio										1.11	1.06	1.06	1.06

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player9	18	1880	1897	8,837	1,620	2,467	138	1,322	244	.317	.397	.486	.883
Comparison										.265	.323	.357	.680
Ratio										1.20	1.23	1.36	1.30

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player10	18	1880	1897	5,770	1,129	1,625	71	883	354	.303	.351	.456	.807
Comparison										.265	.323	.357	.680
Ratio										1.14	1.09	1.28	1.19

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player11	18	1882	1899	9,409	1,678	2,250	53	1,067	568	.271	.355	.372	.727
Comparison										.267	.329	.359	.687
Ratio										1.01	1.08	1.04	1.06

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player12	17	1882	1898	8,182	1,521	1,951	64	736	657	.265	.337	.361	.698
Comparison										.266	.328	.358	.686
Ratio										1.00	1.03	1.01	1.02

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player13	13	1884	1896	5,739	1,069	1,496	44	735	468	.292	.364	.376	.740
Comparison										.265	.330	.359	.689
Ratio										1.10	1.10	1.05	1.07

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player14	15	1885	1906	6,502	1,256	1,979	127	1,299	229	.331	.384	.505	.888
Comparison										.269	.334	.362	.696
Ratio										1.23	1.15	1.40	1.28

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player15	18	1885	1903	9,106	1,642	2,502	118	1,093	418	.306	.374	.444	.818
Comparison										.270	.334	.360	.694
Ratio										1.13	1.12	1.23	1.18

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player16	21	1887	1907	9,710	1,333	2,645	47	1,371	301	.292	.328	.382	.710
Comparison										.267	.331	.354	.685
Ratio										1.09	0.99	1.08	1.04

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player17	17	1887	1903	8,979	1,639	2,532	69	1,014	583	.316	.385	.417	.802
Comparison										.272	.337	.364	.701
Ratio										1.16	1.14	1.15	1.14

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player18	13	1887	1899	7,610	1,227	2,083	66	1,124	323	.302	.364	.416	.781
Comparison										.273	.340	.367	.707
Ratio										1.11	1.07	1.13	1.10

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player19	20	1888	1907	10,470	1,600	2,930	86	1,575	315	.308	.361	.435	.796
Comparison										.267	.331	.354	.684
Ratio										1.15	1.09	1.23	1.16

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player20	16	1888	1903	8,389	1,599	2,596	101	1,464	455	.346	.411	.505	.917
Comparison										.272	.337	.363	.700
Ratio										1.27	1.22	1.39	1.31

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player21	17	1888	1906	7,827	1,552	2,282	106	1,302	574	.324	.384	.449	.834
Comparison										.270	.335	.360	.695
Ratio										1.20	1.15	1.25	1.20

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player22	14	1888	1901	7,584	1,690	2,158	40	736	912	.344	.455	.432	.887
Comparison										.274	.340	.366	.705
Ratio										1.26	1.34	1.18	1.26

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player23	14	1888	1902	8,369	1,426	2,044	40	726	594	.287	.386	.373	.759
Comparison										.273	.339	.364	.703
Ratio										1.05	1.14	1.02	1.08

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player24	22	1888	1912	8,198	1,020	1,944	15	823	328	.261	.311	.317	.628
Comparison										.266	.329	.351	.681
Ratio										0.98	0.94	0.90	0.92

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player25	16	1889	1904	8,493	1,455	2,127	91	1,055	534	.277	.335	.383	.718
Comparison										.273	.338	.363	.701
Ratio										1.02	0.99	1.06	1.02

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player26	16	1890	1905	9,605	1,720	2,850	75	952	389	.338	.415	.446	.862
Comparison										.272	.336	.361	.697
Ratio										1.24	1.24	1.24	1.24

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player27	20	1890	1909	10,151	1,539	2,660	73	1,437	616	.295	.361	.405	.766
Comparison										.266	.329	.350	.680
Ratio										1.11	1.10	1.16	1.13

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player28	18	1890	1907	9,368	1,184	2,252	34	1,135	387	.256	.289	.335	.625
Comparison										.269	.333	.355	.688
Ratio										0.95	0.87	0.94	0.91

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player29	18	1890	1907	7,741	1,131	1,929	71	984	302	.273	.325	.360	.685
Comparison										.269	.333	.355	.688
Ratio										1.02	0.98	1.01	1.00

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player30	17	1890	1907	8,133	1,318	2,253	16	736	518	.301	.347	.355	.702
Comparison										.270	.334	.357	.691
Ratio										1.11	1.04	0.99	1.02

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player31	17	1891	1918	5,639	994	1,527	18	840	359	.311	.390	.406	.796
Comparison										.278	.343	.369	.712
Ratio										1.12	1.14	1.10	1.12

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player32	17	1891	1908	8,120	1,421	2,220	65	1,194	443	.317	.402	.451	.853
Comparison										.269	.332	.355	.687
Ratio										1.18	1.21	1.27	1.24

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player33	21	1891	1911	10,390	1,589	2,457	84	1,233	547	.272	.358	.382	.739
Comparison										.265	.329	.349	.678
Ratio										1.02	1.09	1.09	1.09

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player34	19	1892	1910	9,594	1,719	2,932	33	810	495	.341	.388	.415	.802
Comparison										.266	.328	.349	.678
Ratio										1.28	1.18	1.19	1.18

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player35	21	1894	1915	9,819	1,619	2,672	67	1,015	506	.312	.386	.429	.814
Comparison										.267	.328	.349	.677
Ratio										1.17	1.18	1.23	1.20

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player36	25	1894	1918	9,612	1,057	2,309	34	1,121	201	.268	.332	.358	.690
Comparison										.263	.326	.346	.671
Ratio										1.02	1.02	1.04	1.03

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player37	17	1894	1911	8,807	1,278	2,231	22	688	285	.294	.371	.358	.730
Comparison										.268	.328	.351	.679
Ratio										1.10	1.13	1.02	1.07

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player38	14	1895	1908	7,452	1,055	1,999	65	983	194	.294	.343	.409	.752
Comparison										.267	.326	.348	.673
Ratio										1.10	1.05	1.18	1.12

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player39	21	1896	1916	10,460	1,504	3,242	83	1,599	380	.338	.380	.467	.847
Comparison										.261	.323	.341	.664
Ratio										1.30	1.18	1.37	1.28

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player40	17	1897	1915	5,374	682	1,252	26	530	212	.279	.386	.377	.764
Comparison										.254	.316	.333	.649
Ratio										1.10	1.22	1.13	1.18

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player41	21	1897	1917	11,739	1,736	3,415	101	1,732	722	.327	.391	.466	.857
Comparison										.259	.321	.338	.659
Ratio										1.26	1.22	1.38	1.30

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player42	17	1897	1913	9,118	1,296	2,084	56	813	465	.274	.375	.378	.753
Comparison										.261	.322	.340	.662
Ratio										1.05	1.16	1.11	1.14

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player43	17	1898	1914	5,099	797	1,273	20	596	401	.296	.394	.394	.787
Comparison										.259	.320	.337	.658
Ratio										1.14	1.23	1.17	1.20

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player44	13	1898	1910	6,414	950	1,752	48	756	330	.313	.389	.445	.834
Comparison										.258	.317	.334	.651
Ratio										1.21	1.23	1.33	1.28

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player45	19	1898	1918	9,051	1,355	2,143	63	810	361	.269	.340	.370	.710
Comparison										.258	.320	.337	.657
Ratio										1.04	1.06	1.10	1.08

Name	Yrs	From	To	PA	R	H	HR	RBI	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player46	19	1899	1917	10,594	1,391	2,961	97	1,525	366	.309	.362	.452	.814
Comparison										.257	.318	.335	.654
Ratio										1.20	1.14	1.35	1.25

Technology: Settling into Twitter

2010-02-12T17:02:00.000-07:00

Getting initiated to Twitter is a long, slow process. And it is a process. You can't get it in one day. You can't get it by reading a how-to guide. You have to figure it out over the course of several months.

Back in December, I wrote about how I refused to follow more than 200 people because there was no possible way I could focus on everyone. I did not understand those who would follow thousands. They did it either as an insincere gesture (returning the favor for following them) or ended up focusing on a single list and not reading anything most of those people said anyway.

Well, I've altered that stance, though ever so slightly. I still care about what everyone I follow has to say, and I continue to refuse to use a list to focus my attention. I really don't use lists at all, to be honest. Created them, but haven't created a column in TweetDeck for them.

I now follow 354 people.

Eesh. I know, that's a lot. Or a lot more than I ever thought I would or could follow.

But this is the thing. As I've used the service more, I'm not overwhelmed by those 354 people. Back when I followed 150 or 200 people, I was determined to read everything that everyone said from sun up to sun down. That was the source of my fear of the 200 barrier.

I was in the Facebook frame of mind. But as I've used Twitter more, I've realized that I don't need to read every single tweet that comes through. I can take breaks, and when I come back I don't need to start where I left off.

It's a fire hose. But I'll check it when I can and I get a lot of good stuff out of what comes through. No pressure to read it all. And a lot of people I follow will repeat tweets, especially when promoting their blog.

It all clicked when I stumbled across a wonderful blog post by Cindy King about creating your tweet plan. Essentially, she suggests you plan out five tweets per day and schedule them with a service like Hootsuite.

I encourage you to read the article. It's good stuff. And it's perfect for someone like me. I am not a consistent tweeter. Some days I'll tweet a lot, then I'll take a couple of days off. Probably annoying to some followers. This way, I'm always putting something out there.

And so I'm clear, this does not replace your personality on Twitter. It simply assures that you are always putting something out there every day. I reply and retweet and get into conversations as well. But this assures that I'm not left stale if I fall off for a day or two (or three).

The stuff I'm putting into my schedule (my tweet plan) is some of my "timeless" blog entries. So, in case you missed it the first time (likely you did), I'm putting it out there again. So in addition to keeping my activity at a constant level, I am maximizing eyes on my blog. Not only does this give me more traffic, but it helps my followers get a better grip of who I am.

Why does this have anything to do with number of people I can follow? Simple. Stop worrying about catching every tweet out there. People miss stuff. I will miss stuff. You can combat that by tweeting things multiple times (as long as it isn't an annoying level of repeats).

Now that I've accepted that I can't read everything, I am much more comfortable with the number of people I follow. It is a coincidence that I'm following more. Follow Friday has done wonders.

I admit, I struggled finding the right people to follow in the beginning. Very difficult. And it makes me feel for new users. Followed a lot of the wrong people. Tried to force a fit. Just didn't work.

But now that I've found a solid core of people I enjoy following, Follow Friday has become a gold mine. As a result, I'm following a lot more people. And these are people who may also enjoy my blog due to common interests, so it works both ways.

Following more people has greatly enhanced my experience on Twitter, I admit it. And unless you're famous, it's the only way to grow your network. Because seriously? The only people I don't mind following who don't follow me back are celebrities (for the most part). You need to have mutual relationships. It's not that you need an insincere gesture. You simply want to share conversations. Makes it difficult if it's a one way street.

And that was my problem before. I wanted to grow my base, but I didn't want to follow more people. Just not possible.

Now let me be clear, I still am careful about the people I follow. Even though I'm following more people, I do not open myself to spam by following everyone who follows me. I still only follow people who are interesting to me. It's just that I somehow broke through with my network and now have no trouble whatsoever finding those people.

So my advice? Be sincere. Follow those who interest you. Don't limit yourself, but be reasonable. And to help stabilize your own content, create a tweet plan. Best thing I've ever done.

What do you think? Is there a maximum number of people you will follow? Do you supplement your tweets with scheduled tweets? Let me know how you use Twitter and what works for you.

Sports: A "Princely Sum" or King's Ransom?

2010-02-11T15:54:00.003-07:00

In response to Garry D. Howard's Princely Sum is a Must, from JSOline.com.

Garry D. Howard is the Sports Editor for the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel's JSOnline.com. I rarely see anything written by him, but he's a smart guy and writes well.

But this article is stupid.

I couldn't help but think I was reading overzealous fan comments at the bottom of a sports article about the Milwaukee Brewers on this site.

Why? No perspective whatsoever.

Will the franchise be able to get its first World Series ring sans The Baddest Man in Miller Park History?

Not in their wildest dreams.

So, this morning we have just two words for multimillionaire boy wonder Mark Attanasio: Sign him.

Oh, and one more: Now.

And in return, I offer more than 3 million reasons why you should find the money in the vault at the bottom of that spacious Southern California palace you and Debbie and the A-Kids call home, and then back that up with another 3 million reasons to be followed by another 3 million yet to come in the 2010 major-league baseball season.

Snore. I don't know where to start with this. Let's just start from the top...

"Sign him" and "Now." Well, that's a problem because you also need Fielder and Scott Boras to agree to signing a contract before he hits the open market. Boras wants Fielder to hit the open market. So in order to agree to such a long-term deal now, it would need to be worth it. In other words, he'd have to think the deal he's getting would be at least as good if not better than what he'd get by waiting.

And, please, forget the home team discount. It's a myth. Not going to happen. And certainly won't come from a Boras client.

If the Brewers won't be able to compete with the Red Sox, Mets or Yankees (not that they'd want him, but why not?) when Fielder hits the market, how in the world could they overpay now?

"I offer more than 3 million reasons why..." Ugh. I've seen this argument so many times. People. If all the Brewers needed was fans to make the revenue to sign players, they'd be fine. But that's not the entire story. It's a small part of the story. They can't compete with the big market teams financially because of media contracts, not because of attendance.

No one seems to understand this. Milwaukee is one of the smallest markets -- if not the smallest market -- in all of baseball. They have a very average payroll, which is amazing. It wasn't long ago that they had the lowest or close to the lowest payroll every season. They are at $80 Million now because they are willing to pay to compete, and the attendance helps. But demanding the mini market Brewers pay like a big market team (just another $15 Million) is crazy.

You give them an inch, they ask for a foot.

So, what, you're going to overextend yourself to keep those three million fans coming to the park? To repay them? Lose money, just to say thank you? I don't think so.

Some more...

Of course, you will have to increase your current payroll of about $80 million by at least $15 million per, but your steadfast fans have proven they will pay you right back (as will MLB, through revenue sharing) by continuing to roll through the turnstiles and hot dog lines in record numbers as they have since that wonderful stadium was built with, yes, the tax off of said working man's back.

This is painful to read. So incredibly short sighted.

"Of course, you will have to increase your current payroll of about $80 million by at least $15 million per..." This is wrong. "At least" is right, though. And then some.

Without reworking his current deal that expires after the 2010 season, Prince Fielder will be paid $10.5 Million this season. He has one arbitration year left, and if he performs anywhere close to the way he did last year, he can expect to make at least $15 Million in 2011 (Ryan Howard's salary in his final year of arbitration).

Prince can expect about $20 Million per season for about five seasons in free agency. So to make a deal worthwhile, he'd want to sign for a contract that would look something like this:

2010: $15 Million
2011: $18 Million
2012: $20 Million
2013: $20 Million
2014: $20 Million
2015: $20 Million
2016: $20 Million

That's a seven year extension for $133 Million. In my opinion, it's conservative and reasonable.

But don't forget Ryan Braun. Here are his upcoming salaries:

2010: $1 Million
2011: $4 Million
2012: $6 Million
2013: $8.5 Million
2014: $10 Million
2015: $12 Million

And you know they will also need to find a way to keep Braun before he hits the free agent market in 2016, too, right? The Brewers will need to "repay" the fans. And Braun, more than likely, will also need $20 Million per season. And to be honest, he is grossly underpaid now. What's stopping him from demanding his deal be reworked a year or two down the line? Or stopping the Brewers from wanting to extend that deal to prevent him from becoming a free agent?

So, let's say the Brewers pay Fielder. In 2014, they have $30 Million tied up in two players (nearly triple what they are being paid now). And it's entirely possible they'll need to give Braun a raise or extend him. At which point, there's the possibility of paying two players a total of $40 Million per year.

Crazy? This is possibly the best offensive duo in baseball -- at least arguable that it is the best in the National League. They need to be paid like it.

Oh, you want pitching, too? Well, you're eventually going to have to pay Yovani Gallardo. If he continues to improve, he'll be looking at a deal soon just south of Tim Lincecum money. And he's making near the minimum right now.

The Brewers will just find this extra money, right?

"But Bill Hall and Jeff Suppan are coming off the books!" Yup. But you will always have a bad contract or two on your roster. You always have to plan for some dead money. You can't just look to the future and assume you suddenly free up $15 Million for Prince.

This isn't play money. By dedicating this type of money to one player (and eventually another), small market teams fight awfully dangerously with fire. The Yankees can invest more than $100 Million in one player over multiple years (actually, several players). If the guy's career ends suddenly, they just replace that contract with a new one.

Think the Jeff Suppan and Bill Hall contracts are crippling? Multiply it by 10 if they somehow convinced Prince to sign a long-term, pre-free agency contract and he got hurt. And as we all know (and many of us speculated before 2009), Fielder's weight is a potential problem that could force an early decline. Is he the perfect player for this type of risk? Absolutely not.

You can't win this way in a small market. You just can't. By paying Prince (and presumably Braun and Gallardo), you're putting all of your eggs in a very small basket. You then surround those three players by very cheap players. Forget going after Randy Wolf in free agency. Pitching would suffer immensely.

The Brewers won 80 games last season with Fielder, Braun and Gallardo under very affordable deals. How will they complement these players when they are making a combined $40 Million instead of $12 Million? How can we expect the complementary players to be any better than the current ones since the amount of cash available for them will be greatly diminished?

And how, if the Brewers can be expected to be a worse team as a result, can anyone claim that the fans will continue to come out at a 3 Million per year clip to watch a losing team?

While we all can acknowledge that a World Series would, theoretically, be more easily won with Prince than without, you can't discount the financial ramifications. It may be true for the short-term, but not long-term. And, of course, he's under control for two seasons regardless.

If he's signed to big money, that significantly impacts your ability to field a quality roster. And if they can't win a World Series while he and his young supporting cast are affordable, how can we expect them to win one following a big payday?

It indeed stings, but the Brewers will need to part with Fielder. Assuming Braun doesn't want his contract reworked, he is affordable and on the roster for the next six seasons. You need to build around him. If the Brewers fall out of the race this or next season, Fielder will need to be traded for another round of young guns who will hopefully keep the team competitive. If they remain competitive and in the race, ride him out and collect the draft picks.

And as a small market team, that's all you can hope for. Remain competitive. Don't take unnecessary risks. You do, and you'll put yourself in a decade hole of ineptitude.

Brewers fans, who have experienced such a drought, should know and fear this more than anyone.

Sports: In Search of Baseball's Statistical Holy Grail

2010-02-09T20:25:00.003-07:00

A while back, I engaged in a study to compare player stats -- Hall of Famers and non-Hall of Famers -- as part of a project for my eight year-old son. The goal? Strip away the names and determine which players deserved to be inducted.

While this was a rather complex project (you can download the 57-page "test" here), I relied entirely on rather standard statistics. For each player, I provided the following information:

Number of seasons played
Year started and finished
Number of All-Star Games
Number of MVP awards
Total plate appearances
Total runs
Total hits
Total home runs
Total RBI
Total stolen bases
Lifetime Batting Average
Lifetime OBP
Lifetime Slugging Percentage
Lifetime OPS

Additionally, I provided the league average BA, OBP, SLG and OPS during that player's era as well as the ratio of his statistic over that league average.

Simple enough? Not really. But made for an interesting project.

But what if I wanted to expand this research to be more than just a third grader's project? While these stats are generally considered the accepted method for analyzing performance, they certainly aren't the be all, end all. And we want to assess performance as accurately as possible.

Each offensive stat has its own flaw. Runs scored and RBI are partially reliant on teammates driving the player in (runs) or being on base and running the bases well (RBI). Total hits can be deceiving as well. In some eras, piling on hits was easier than in others. Likewise, a nice total can be accumulated in a very good, though not great, and long career. And great, though short, careers will lack hit totals. As we know all too well, home runs were common during the Steroid Era. Yet, just before Babe Ruth arrived, the average team hit fewer than 20 home runs per season.

That said, you can't rely entirely on qualitative stats either. What good is a great AVG, OBP, SLG or OPS if the career was five seasons long? And how do you know if any of those stats are great without being relative to their peers? Stats can be deceiving. The average batting average was .239 in 1908, .269 in 1912, and .291 in 1921. Many played through all three seasons, and the definition of a "good" season each year was comparatively different.

This is why I used ratios of the player's qualitative stat to the league average. Yet, even that made me a bit uncomfortable. The top and bottom ranges are not equal for each stat, so the way we evaluate the percentage for each would need to be different. It's an inexact science.

Regardless, not one of those qualitative stats properly encapsulates overall value. In other words, what single statistic can we use to measure one player over another? The BA and OBP statistics don't consider power. And none of the statistics consider speed or ability to run the bases.

The reason I wanted one stat is that when you start focusing on multiple stats you inevitably begin favoring a particular type of player. And you only use multiple stats because no one stat does the job adequately. So, is there a single statistic that can do the job of many?

I put out an APB on Twitter.

Question for my baseball peeps: In your opinion, which single stat best reflects all-around offensive value?

I quickly received several responses.

@heelsonthefield: OPS
@theMercyRule: The simple, unsexy run.
@HrzMatt: OBP probably
@WisconsinRob: If there had to be one, it's probably OPS.
@GregFertel: wOBA or wRC+ encapsulate total offensive value the best.
@n8van2: OPS+
@CrashburnAlley: wOBA

Seven people, six surprisingly different answers. I'll say that I'm not sold on OPS. I like how it combines OBP and SLG, but it seems so inexact to simply add them together. But I admit, I often use it as the stat to evaluate talent.

I was particularly intrigued by the answers of wOBA, wRC+ and OPS+. I'm a stat nerd, but admit that I know far too little about these and other advanced statistics. There are other offensive statistics, such as EQA and VORP, that may also be the magic stat I'm looking for.

Of course, I don't completely understand any of these statistics. And as I've researched them on FanGraphs, I've found that it isn't as easy as plugging the peripheral statistics into a formula to determine these values back to the 1800s. I have to rely on whatever data sites like FanGraphs have. Many of these stats are determined slightly differently from season to season, depending on a baseline (at least, as far as I know). And not all necessary data is available to calculate these values for all of the players I want to evaluate.

And so, I appeal to you just as I appealed to my Twitter followers. What single stat would you use to evaluate offensive worth of a player? This stat needs to be all-encompassing. Power, hitting ability, runs scored. It appears that wOBA and wRC+ do this. But do we have the necessary data for all of the players I want to evaluate?

Maybe there is more than one stat would be fine for this purpose, but there cannot be overlap between the two or three stats. Doesn't seem likely or possible.

I guess what I'm doing is no different than what others before me have done. I want to do two things: 1) compare players within eras, and 2) compare players between eras. I want to determine who truly deserves Hall of Fame induction, at least based on offensive performance only.

I know. I'm chasing the Holy Grail.

What do you think? Is there a single stat you would or could use to accomplish this task? What would it be?

Sports: Super Bowl XLIV a Victory for Play Calling

2010-02-07T21:07:00.006-07:00

Super Bowl XLIV was a victory for aggressive play calling.

Maybe, just maybe, we're a step closer to never again hearing the following argument: "Because you just don't do that!"

I feared that after Bill Belichick's failed fourth down play against the Colts earlier this season that we were in store for an increasingly conservative National Football League. Then the Saints won the Super Bowl.

Thank you.

With just under two minutes left to play in the first half at the Colts' one yard line, Sean Payton and the Saints decided to go for it on fourth down rather than kicking the field goal.

Phil Simms summed up the feelings of the millions of NFL purists when he said something to the effect of, "You just put points on the board."

That's the problem with the "purist" opinion of football fans. There are no statistics or probability involved. You just do things because "that's how you do it."

The problem was, though, that Sean Payton wasn't faced with the choice of seven points or three points. It was a much more complicated decision.

If He Goes for It
If Sean Payton goes for it and is successful, the game is tied. The Colts still have just under two minutes left in the half, and will likely start around their 25 yard line. They will be aggressive. Knowing that offense, no one would bet against them scoring at least three points there.

If Sean Payton goes for it and fails, the Colts have the ball at their own one yard line with under two minutes remaining. Standard here is to run out the clock -- or as much of the clock as you can. You don't want to turn the ball over. First down is important, but throwing an incompletion is a risk that is staring you in the face.

Because of this, Payton knows that he has a reasonably good chance of getting the ball back -- and in very good field position -- before the half ends, even if he fails to convert on fourth down. In fact, they even have the chance of getting a safety.

While going for it successfully was the preferred result, failing wasn't necessarily bad either. He knew he had a good chance of getting the ball back since failing would put the Colts in a position to be conservative.

If He Kicks
If Sean Payton decides to kick, it's more or less a foregone conclusion that they get three points there. However, once again the Colts would get the ball at or around their own 25 yard line with just under two minutes remaining. The Colts would be aggressive, unlike the situation with the ball at their one. After giving up points and having better field position, they would not be conservative. The odds of them scoring would be relatively good.

I love the call. It shows that a coach's decision is complex, and not what is immediately in front of him. The end result, in particular, validates the decision. The Saints failed to convert, but whether or not it was the right call could not yet be determined (despite what the pundits may have said at that point). The Colts were stopped on three downs, the Saints got the ball back in great field position (expected as such if they stopped them), and drove enough yardage to kick a field goal.

In the end, isn't this the second best result for the Saints? If they go for it and get the touchdown, the Colts may or may not score again. But a touchdown from the Colts wasn't likely (though not impossible).

By going for it and failing, it set up the least possible scenario for the Colts to score. And set up a pretty good chance for them to get their three points as time expired.

Obviously, the preferred result is to go for it and succeed. But by keeping an aggressive Peyton Manning off of the field and still getting three points on the board, failing was nearly just as good.

The Onside Kick
The onside kick to start the second half by the Saints was brilliant. But you know what? It's only brilliant because coaches have no guts.

If aggressive play calling becomes more popular than conservative play calling, that becomes a bad play. It only works because it was a surprise.

After the kick, Trey Wingo tweeted that the greatness of Peyton Manning forced Sean Payton to make that call. I disagree. It is the accepted conservative play calling in the NFL that makes this play possible. No one wants to risk giving Peyton Manning the ball to start the half at their own 40 yard line. But because it was so unexpected, it became a high percentage play (accepted by the purists or not).

Definition of "Purist"
As I write this, it's striking to me the difference between fan "purity" in baseball and football. You're a baseball purist because you are infatuated with statistics. It's the purists who are so offended by the Steroid Era and the way drugs have manipulated records.

Yet, NFL purists seem to have little care about statistics or percentages. Every argument revolves around a common set of words: "That's just the way it's done." You don't go for it on fourth down, barring a very strict set of circumstances, because "that's just the way it's done." You certainly don't start the second half with an onside kick.

Aggressive Play Calling Wins
While I may have been rooting for the Saints to win this game, I really didn't care much one way or the other. I am a Packers fan and pull for the underdog.

But, I am so happy today for those who like "aggressive" play calling in the NFL. I use quotation marks because it's only seen as aggressive when compared to the norm. In reality, it's just going with percentages and understanding what is and isn't expected in that situation.

This is a win for us. There were three very aggressive play calls in this game (fourth and goal by the Saints, fourth and two by the Colts in the second half, and the onside kick). Only the fourth and goal wasn't fully successful. Yet, even that play inevitably worked in the Saints' favor.

Bill Belichick's call in 2009 will be long remembered, but for all the wrong reasons. It seemed incredibly risky, but only because it's a call that no one makes (and for all the wrong reasons). In reality, it was no worse than a 50/50 proposition.

Sean Payton proved all season long that you can win by going against conventional wisdom. You can win more than just a few games. You can win your conference and beat the team that everyone thinks is the league's greatest (and one that plays it "by the book") on the biggest stage.

I was impressed with Sean Payton today because he stuck with what got him to this game. He didn't suddenly get conservative with the spotlight on him. He didn't freeze. Even when his first risky call "failed" he continued to challenge conventional play calling.

And for that reason, the Saints' victory today was a win for more than just New Orleans. It was a win for aggressive play calling. The loser? Grandpas without logical arguments.